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Özet 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Temsili Mücadele, Kürt milliyetçiliği, HEP, DEP, HADEP, 
DTP 
 
 1990 sonrası Türkiye’de Kürt milliyetçiliği siyasi partiler kanalıyla 
örgütlenmeye başlamıştır. Kürt milliyetçiliğini referans alan partilerin Türk 
siyasi hayatına girişi ile birlikte Kürt milliyetçiliği ve Türk milliyetçiliği 
arasındaki mücadele politik alana kaymıştır. Politik alandaki mücadelenin 
niteliği, Türk siyasi hayatının sınırları ve partileşmiş olan Kürt milliyetçiliğinin 
tavrıyla yıllar içinde şekillenmiştir. Temsili mücadele olarak adlandırdığımız 
Kürt milliyetçiliğinin siyasasallaşması ana akım partiler gibi geleneksel bir 
yolda ilerlemeyip; Türk siyasi hayatında sosyal hareketlilik yaratarak radikal 
bir çizgi izlemiştir. Bu tez Kürt milliyetçiliğinin partiler aracılığıyla sürdürdüğü 
temsili mücadeleyi,  tarihi arka planıyla birlikte anlatmaktadır. 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Keywords: Representative Contention, Kurdish nationalism, HEP, DEP, 
HADEP, DTP 
Kurdish nationalism started to organize through the pro-Kurdish 
political parties in Turkey after 1990. The struggle between Kurdish 
nationalism and Turkish nationalism shifted towards the political field with the 
entrance of pro-Kurdish political parties to Turkish political life. The  nature of 
struggle in the political  field, has been shaped over the years according to the 
limits of the Turkish political life and the political attitude of pro-Kurdish 
political parties. The politicization of Kurdish nationalism which is considered 
as representative contention does not move along in a traditional way like 
mainstream parties; they followed a radical line by creating social mobilization 
in Turkish political life. This thesis explains the representative contention of 
Kurdish nationalism throughout pro-Kurdish political parties with its historical 
background. 
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     Introduction 
 
The politicization of Kurdish nationalism is a long process, and the 
focus point of the thesis would be the legal politicization of Kurdish 
nationalism which covers the pro-Kurdish political parties who tries to appeal 
Kurdish rights since 1990. 
Political parties are the products of Kurdish nationalism which is 
perceived generally as the counterpart of Turkish nationalism. The Kurdish 
nationalism followed a similar pattern with Turkish nationalism in its 
evolution. While Turkish nationalism assumes certain sacredness as the 
founder ideology of Turkish state and strengthens its position during the 
foundation process of the Turkish Republic through security concerns, Kurdish 
nationalism passed through three phases, namely religious-feudal against the 
newly founded regime, leftist with leftist social movements in Turkey in 
1960’s and purely nationalist through the founding of a separate party which 
tries to appeal Kurdish cultural and political right. These phases would be 
analyzed through the mechanisms of “contentious politics” theory which could 
explain the political evolution of Kurdish nationalism from social movements 
to legal political parties. 
It is certain that much of politics takes place in traditional structures of 
a party, bureau, faction, union, community or interest group; non-violent action 
and protest politics are not generally taken into consideration in the analysis of 
 2 
contentious politics.
1
 “Contentious politics means episodic, public, collective 
interaction among makers of claims and their objects when at least one 
government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and the 
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants but 
all politics is not contentious.”2 Direct challenges to existing systems from 
political parties or interest groups may be examined under the category of 
contentious politics especially those by the pro-Kurdish political parties in 
Turkey who try to appeal Kurdish rights. Nicole F. Watts described the 
participation of political parties in the Turkish political system as 
“ethnopolitical incorporation into representative politics”. The phrase that she 
uses to explain this phenomenon is “representative contention”. She 
emphasizes the difference between public and representative contention for 
clarifying the concept  
“Representative contention, which occurs when resistance to state 
policies is taken up within representative institutions of the state, such as 
the Parliament. Unlike public contention, which may be attributed to 
radical elements of society and silenced by eradicating the institutions that 
support it, representative contention takes place within official arenas that 
make up the hearth of body politics”.3 
But she links this nature of political parties with the type of democracy 
that exists in Turkey, namely semi-democracy
4
. The restrictions on freedom of 
expression and association in spite of fair and free elections in semi democratic 
countries like Turkey force the Kurdish movement to search for an institutional 
basis for their claims but conventional politics limits the possibility of building 
                                                                
1
 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge 
University Press,1998,  New York, p.5 
2
  Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, New York, p.5 
3
 Nicole F. Watts, Unpublished PH.D. Thesis, Routes to Ethnic Resistance: Virtual Kurdistan 
West and the Transformation of Kurdish Politics in Turkey, University of Washington, 2001, 
p.133 
4
 Nicole F. Watts, “Activists in Office: Pro-Kurdish contentious politics in Turkey”, 
Ethnopolitics, Vol.5, No.2, June 2006, p.126-128 
 3 
this basis and as a result cannot bring an end to the conflict. Hence political 
parties used non-conventional protests repertoires like hunger strikes, cross-
country symbolic marches and funeral demonstrations against the resistance of 
Turkish state. But these contentious actions created the perception that these 
parties are the uncompromising political actors of the system, consequently 
leaded to the political radicalization of the newcomer party. 
The boundary between institutionalized and non- institutionalized 
politics may not reflect the natural border of contention. Tarrow, Tilly and Mc 
Adam explained this complexity by dividing contentious politics into two 
subcategories; contained contention (institutional) and transgressive 
(unconventional) contention. The main difference between contained and 
transgressive contention is that the former is characterized by conventional 
political tools whereas the latter is more marginalized in terms of the tools 
applied.
5
 Both of these two types, namely contained and transgressive 
contention, reflect the dynamics of ethnic contention in Turkey because 
identity struggles occur in the politics of established institutions as well as in 
the disruptions of rebellions, strikes and social movements. The differentiation 
in the categories of contentious politics is an indication of the long trajectory of 
ethnic contention in Turkey from the rebellions in early 1920’s to 
representative contention. 
The political actors in Turkey were very determining in the whole 
trajectory of political parties. While SHP and Özal played a role as 
transformative actors in distinctive political identity formation in the 1990's, 
PKK cannot be excluded in the analysis of   the relations of parties with the 
State. But the political parties’ political adventure would be short-lived and this 
would lead to the famous vicious circle of political parties which starts with the 
closure of a party by the Constitutional Court and continues with the opening 
of a new one. While this process made legal struggle difficult for political 
parties, the political maturation of the parties within the system was not 
                                                                
5
 Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, p.7-8 
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possible and they tried to stay in the political arena through contentious 
actions. 
 If we divide Kurdish contentious politics into various episodes, we 
observe that the nature of these episodes changes according to the internal and 
international conjuncture during the whole trajectory. The struggle until the 
1990’s is strictly compatible with the Static Classic Social Movement Agenda. 
The Static Social Movement Agenda is a process in which the steps of 
movement have a cause-effect relationship among themselves, while social 
changes cause the framing of grievances through mobilizing structures; these 
mobilizing structures becomes representational power through contentious 
interactions. But after 1990 and, the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, the types of 
contentious politics began to intersect with each other and turned into a more 
dynamic model with the identity transformation of Kurdish parliamentarians 
from mainstream politicians to ethnic ones and political change of political 
parties after 1994, the closing down of HEP. But the ethnic contention, and in 
general contentious politics, emerges in response to changes in political 
opportunities and constraints, with participants responding to different 
incentives: material and ideological, partisan and group-based, long-standing 
and episodic.
6
 The founding of the Turkish Republic which is the main source 
of the changes in political opportunities and constraints pulled the trigger for 
ethnic contention as nationalism is at the center of ethnic contention in Turkey. 
Nationalism involves the twin claims that distinct nations have the right to 
possess distinct states, and that rulers of distinct states have the right to impose 
national cultural definitions on inhabitants of those states.
7
 The founding of the 
new Turkish Republic was the realization of these processes especially for the 
first years; state-seeking nationalism led to the disintegration of pre-existing 
political structures with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and as the 
creation of Turkish Republic in other words the nation-building process of the 
                                                                
6
 Ibid., p.40 
7
 Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, p.229 
 5 
new Republic entailed the redrawing of national citizenship boundaries all over 
again. 
 The main interest of this study is the period after the 1990’s. The reason 
why this time period is chosen is the beginning of the causal chains that 
enabled legal mobilization. The main question is “how people who at a given 
point in time are not making contentious claims start doing so?” In the first part 
of the study, the reasons for the contentious politics, especially the origins of 
Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms will be analyzed; we will then focus on our 
main subject, the legal mobilization of Kurdish nationalism within political 
parties, the transformative actors of Kurdish politics and the changing 
landscape of political parties which appeal Kurdish cultural and political rights. 
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Chapter 1 Counter Nationalisms 
The general distinction between nationalism as an actual sense of 
community with its political manifestation and nationalism as a manipulative 
ideology
8
 reflects barely the nation-building processes of the twentieth century. 
As quoted by David Brown, Kenneth Minogue observes, “Nationalism … 
began by describing itself as the political and historical consciousness of the 
nation, and came in time to the inventing of the nations for which it could act 
… Instead of  a dog beginning to wag its political tail, we find political tails 
trying to wag dogs”.9 The nation-building process of the new Turkish Republic 
was no exception. The effort of the new Turkish elites for finding new sources 
of legitimacy is a proof of that process.
10
 These legitimization efforts were 
summarized under four main sub-titles by Şerif Mardin: “the transition in the 
political system of authority from personal rule to impersonal rules and 
regulations; the shift in understanding the order of the universe from divine law 
to positivist and rational thinking; the shift from a community founded upon 
the ““elite-people cleavage”” to a ““populist based”” community; and the 
transition from a religious-community to a nation state.”11 But the transition 
from a religious community to a nation-state went along with the policy of 
                                                                
8
 David Brown, “Why is The Nation-State so Vulnerable to Ethnic Nationalism”, Nations and 
Nationalism 4, 1998,  p.5 
9
 Ibid., p.5  
10
 Ibid., p.2 
11
 Şerif Mardin, Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1994, p.20 
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denying the existence of national minorities in Turkey such as the Kurds who 
were described as “Mountain Turks”.12  
1.1) Turkish Nationalism        
  After the First World War, all the treaties on the protection of 
minorities took into account the triple criteria of ethnicity, language and 
religion.
13
 For example, in the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities in 
Poland, the first of this type of treaty, all three, ethnicity, language and religion 
were accepted in Articles 8, 9 and 12. Yet the criteria of ethnicity and language 
have not been accepted by the Turkish Republic during the signing of the 
Treaty of Lausanne. Despite the achievement of the Allies to impose the triple 
criteria to all defeated states of the First World War, Turkey as a result of the 
legitimacy gained through the War of Independence, obtained the power to 
negotiate the terms of minority rights. Hence the Allies limited their terms to 
the criterion of religion and the purpose had been the protection of their co-
religionists.
14
 
 After Lausanne, the Republic of Turkey used the criterion of religion 
as the only determining factor of the existence of a minority. This was in many 
ways a continuation of the Ottoman policy. The construction of Ottoman 
identity was based on the concept of ümmet, with religious communities 
distinguished as Muslims and non Muslims. The historical causes of the 
differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslims are not limited to the policy 
of the Ottoman Empire because the intervention of major western powers in 
domestic affairs under the pretext of protecting the rights of non Muslims, has 
led to their identification as “the Other”. This concept of “the Other”(strictly 
defined in terms of religion) secured an advantage to the Turkish Republic in 
the construction of a new nation. However the theoretical framework for 
                                                                
12
 Doğu Ergil, “Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey”, Journal of International 
Affairs, Fall 2000, no.1, The Trustees of Columbia University, New York, p.51 
13
Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2004, p.62 
14
 Baskın Oran, Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2001, p.226 
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defining minority on the basis on religion was not applied directly, and the 
state has implemented practices inconsistent with public policy as in the case of 
the Kurdish people. 
  The prescribed territorial divisions in the Sèvres Treaty15 shaped the 
nation building project of Turkish elites in favor of more ethnicity-based model 
contrary to the regulations in the Lausanne Treaty. In other words the Sèvres 
Treaty has been the determining factor in this context as the founding elites 
designated precisely the territorial, national and ethnic-political boundaries of 
the modern Turkish nation state.
16
 Doğu Ergil claims that the “fear of  partition 
and subversion constantly haunted the Turkish elite and bred growing 
suspicion of foreigners and their sinister domestic collaborators who wanted to 
divide up the country and undermine national unity.”17 Henri J. Barkey and 
Graham E. Fuller refer to the Sèvres syndrome as a “national security problem” 
by arguing that the minority perception of Turks includes only the non-
Muslims.
18
 In a similar manner, but with better perception, Tanıl Bora defines 
the Sèvres syndrome as the crisis of eternal survival (ebed-müddet bekaa 
krizi).
19
 Ahmet İçduygu and Özlem Kaygusuz on the other hand explain the 
Sèvres syndrome by summarizing the measures taken by the new Turkish 
Republic for national unity: 
                                                                
15
 TheTreaty of Sèvres, (Aug. 10, 1920), post-World War I pact between the victorious Allied 
powers and representatives of the government of Ottoman Turkey. The treaty abolished the 
Ottoman Empire and obliged Turkey to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and North Africa. 
The pact also provided for an independent Armenia, for an autonomous Kurdistan, and for a 
Greek presence in eastern Thrace and on the Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control 
over the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles. Rejected by the new Turkish 
nationalist regime, the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. 
16
 Ahmet İçduygu and Özlem Kaygusuz , “The Politics of Citizenship by Drawing Borders: 
Foreign Policy and the Construction of National Citizenship Identity in Turkey”, Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol.40, No.6, November 2004, pp.29-32 
17
 Doğu Ergil, “Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey”, p.49 
18
 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 1998, New York, p.3 
19
 Tanıl Bora, Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı, Birikim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995, p.77 
 9 
 “First, the former Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim origin, namely the 
Greeks, Armenians and Jews were definitely excluded from the future 
community inside. Secondly, the Ottoman-Muslim majority, which was 
composed of various ethnic and religious communities - Turks, Kurds, 
Circassians, Lazes, Arabs and some other smaller sects, were portrayed as 
a single organic cultural unit, which would be the principal social basis of 
the new political organization.”20 
These ethnic and religious communities at the periphery could preserve their 
economic, social, cultural and regional autonomy until the nineteenth century 
by being dependent on the center with political ties.  But especially after the 
nineteenth century, according to Elçin Aktoprak, the relations between the 
periphery and center changed in favor of the center. The construction of nation-
states advances simultaneously with capitalism; consequently   the autonomous 
center-periphery relations yield economic and administrative centralization 
with the advent of cultural homogenization efforts.
21
 On the other hand, Hakan 
Özoğul emphasizes the importance of capitalism by referring to nationalism 
theories. He summarizes the constructionist approach in two sub-categories, 
the materialists (who suggest that nationalism and nations were created as a 
result of the need for capitalism’s growth) and culturalists (who emphasize the 
non-materialist constructions of nationalism). Ernest Geller’s approach in 
constructionist nationalism which emphasizes the needs of industrial society 
for improving their political, bureaucratic and economic power is largely 
compatible with the new Turkish Republic’s demand for legitimacy. On the 
other hand Ernest Renan, who describes one of the principles of culturalist 
approach as “the collective act of forgetting the past”, helps us to make sense 
of the Turkish state’s dissociation from the Ottoman past. 
                                                                
20
 Ibid., p.36 
21
 Elçin Aktoprak, “Kürt Açılımında Model Arayışları: Kuzey İrlanda ve Bask Örnekleri”, Birikim, 
Vol:247, November 2009, p.21 
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It can be claimed that the nationalism of the Turkish Republic has a 
dualistic character, which is both civic and ethnic. The important point is that 
whether civic or ethnic, nationalism is the sina qua non of Turkish modernity.
22
 
1.1.1) Civic-Ethnic Nationalism Dichotomy 
The ethnic-civic dichotomy, the most popular classification in the 
nationalism literature is that of Kohn’s Western and Eastern forms of 
nationalism.
23
 Kohn explains this dichotomy by referring to two different types 
of nation-building processes: 
“The ideas of the nation and nationalism arose within preexisting 
state structures that encompassed populations with a relatively high degree 
of cultural homogeneity, or developped simultaneously with those 
structures. Inspired by Enlightenment ideas of liberty and equality, 
Western nationalism struggled against dynastic rule and equated 
citizenship with membership in the nation. Thus in the Western model, the 
state temporally precedes(or coincides with ) the development of the 
nation. In the socially and politically more backward areas of Central and 
eastern Europe and Asia, however, nationalism arose in policies that very 
poorly coincided with cultural or ethnic boundaries.In these regions, 
nationalism  struggled to “to redraw the political boundaries in conformity 
with ethnographic demands”24 
Kohn distinguished Eastern nationalism in this classification by emphasizing 
the late state structures in the region: 
 Thus in the Eastern model the nation precedes, and seeks to create the 
state. Nations in the East consolidated around the common heritage of a people 
and the irrational idea of the volk, instead of around the notion of citizenship.  
The ethnic nationalism predominates when institutions collapse, when existing 
                                                                
22
 E. Fuat Keyman, “Articulating Citizenship and Identity The Kurdish Question in Turkey”, in 
Citizenship in a Global World  ed.  By E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, Routledge, London, 
2005,  p.267-268 
23
 Umut Özkırımlı, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism A Critical Engagement, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2005, p.22 
24
 Schulman Stephen, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study 
of Nationalism”, Comparative Political Studies, 2002,s.555 
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institutions are not fulfilling peple’s basic needs, and when satisfactory 
alternative structures are not readily avaliable.”25 
The founding of the new Turkish Republic could be analyzed according 
to both models of Kohn because on the one hand it coincided with the nation-
building process; on the other hand the Young Turks the ancestors of Turkish 
republican elites paved the way for the superiority of Turkish ethnicity in the 
bureaucracy since the Tanzimat period.       
Although Turkish experience seems to be compatible with both types of 
nationalism, it needs to be noted that there is scholarly consensus on the fact 
that there is no pure civic nationalism which depends only on territory, 
citizenship, will and consent, political ideology and institutions. For example, 
Brubaker explains the intersection of civic-ethnic nationalism with the cultural 
component; if “culture” is considered as a component of civic nationalism, 
there are only a few ethnic nationalisms which are based solely on only 
common descent; on the contrary, if civic nationalism is based on an acultural 
concept of citizenship, then; all types of nationalisms could be classified under 
the category of ethnic nationalism.
26
 Moreover, he emphasizes the role of the 
state in the categorization of nationalism by distinguishing “state-framed” and 
“counter-state” understandings of nationalism according to ethnic and civic 
components. He notes the dominant role of the state in shaping the authority of 
ethnic and cultural aspects of nationhood in the case of the former as well as 
emphasizing the civic quality of the latter.
27
 Schulman also claims that “nation-
building under a cultural concept of nationhood requires that the state pursue 
cultural assimilation of minorities, because cultural unity is the foundation for a 
strong nation-state in this formulation…”28    
                                                                
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Umut Özkırımlı, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism A Critical Engagement, p.24 
27
 Ibid, p.25 
28
 Schulman Stephen, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study 
of Nationalism”, p. 561 
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The state’s dominant role in the formulation of nationhood is very 
crucial for Turkey’s nation-building process because nationalism became a 
manipulative ideology for Turkish governing elites to consolidate and shape 
the nation. Doğu Ergil calls this process the state-nation model rather than the 
nation-state model.
29
 Mesut Yeğen also emphasizes the centralization and 
consolidation of state power via repressive nationalist policies of the state in 
the 1920’s and 1930’s.30 Betigül Ercan Argun defines “the historical trajectory 
of Turkish state nationalism” as “periodic oscillations between French civic 
and German ethnic variants”, in other words between the principles of jus soli 
and jus sanguinis.
31
These oscillations started in the period of 1919-1924 with 
the prevalence of the idea of Muslim brotherhood during the war of 
Independence; continued with the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate for 
civic citizenship ties and finished with the Article 88 of the first constitution, 
“Everyone who belongs to the Turkish society regardless of religion or race is 
considered Turk…”32 On the contrary Ayşe Kadıoğlu describes these 
oscillations of Turkish nationalism as a paradoxical synthesis which contains 
individual liberty, rational cosmopolitanism, and universalism, and at the same 
time intends for cultural self-preservation in line with the arguments of Ziya 
Gökalp. By the same token, she claims that the dilemma of Turkish nationalism 
is directly inherited from Eastern nationalism and explains the paradoxical 
relations between Eastern and Western nationalism with a quotation from 
Chatterjee:  
“It is both imitative and hostile to the model it imitates. It is imitative in 
that it accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture. But it also 
involves a rejection… of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to 
progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity”. The imitation 
                                                                
29
 Doğu Ergil, “Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey”, p.46 
30
 Mesut Yeğen, Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler, İletişim 
Yayınları, İstanbul 2006, p.140 
31
 Betigül Ercan Argun, “Universal Citizenship Rights and Turkey’s Kurdish Question”, Journal 
of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.19, No.1, 1999, p.90-91 
32
 Ibid., p.90 
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process in Turkey, to elevate Turkey to the level of “muassır medeniyet” 
(contemporary civilization) paved the way for an authoritarian elitist 
modernization project from above.
33
   
 The modernization project manufactured by Kemalist elites from above, 
favored ethnic nationalism against the civic one. Feroz Ahmad argued that, 
“Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It 
was made in the image of the Kemalist elite which won the national struggle 
against foreign invaders and the old regime”.34 The references given to “the 
foreign invaders and the old regime” reflect exactly the methodology of 
Turkish modernization, because modernization contains identity politics- and 
economic transformation at the same time. In other words “the survival 
question” is the most distinctive factor in determining the nation-state as sina 
qua non or approaching Kurdish nationalism as the consequence of feudal and 
backward economic structure of the region. On the one hand, Heper claims that 
the reforms of Kemalist elites such as the campaign of “Citizen! Speak 
Turkish” or the founding institutes of language and history for “Turkification 
policy”, were imposed to ensure the institutional and discursive construction of 
national identity for modernization.
35
On the other hand Ayhan Akman 
observes these reforms as the tools of an alternative nationalism, “modernist 
nationalism” which explains the dualist character of Turkish nationalism via 
will to civilization:  
 “Modernist nationalism differs from civic nationalism mainly by its 
suspicion of, and restrictions on, popular participation. Rather than 
regarding popular participation as a prerequisite of a nation defined by 
common political ideas and institutions (the civic model), or seeing it as 
part of the process of popular, vernacular mobilization of ethnicity (which 
is indispensable in ethnic nationalism), modernist nationalism finds the 
issue of democratic participation precarious and risky: for modernist 
nationalists participation by masses is skeptical because dissidents may 
thwart the project of Westernization. To the extent that modernist 
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nationalism requires conformity to its modernist schema of identities, it 
tends to restrict political and even cultural expression of non-conforming, 
traditional, religious or local identities.”36 
The civic-ethnic dichotomy and the modernist approach of Akman 
evaluate the politics of Turkish new elites especially after 1923 according to 
the cultural aspect of nation-building, but all of the models are too restrictive to 
explain all dimensions of  this process. In other words, all scholars focus on 
one of the dimensions such as territory, ethnicity or culture but as Eley and 
Suny express “…nationality is best conceived as a complex, uneven, and 
unpredictable process, forged from an interaction of cultural coalescence and 
specific political intervention, which cannot be reduced to static criteria of 
language, territory, ethnicity or culture”.37 Hence Ahmet İçduygu and Özlem 
Kaygusuz observe the politics of 1919-1923 as the boundary producing process 
of new Turkish elites from above on all terms by considering internal and 
external national security concerns. 
38
 Also Güneş Murat Tezcür expands this 
approach by using the ethnic-boundary making approach of Wimmer for 
Turkish nationalism as we will see in more detail below.
39
 
1.1.2)  Ethnic Boundary Making 
The boundary producing of new Turkish elites started with the 
territorial identification of “community inside” in the Lausanne Treaty. The 
territorial boundaries which were determined in the negotiations were the 
reflections of national security perceptions of new Turkish elites. In other 
words the national security concerns formed the content of treaty’s territorial 
articles; Western Thrace, the Mosul and Hatay provinces were bartered away 
for the “idealized religious-cultural homogeneity” of the new Republic. Hence 
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the territorial boundaries which were determined under the pressure of 
“national security concept” draw the modern national citizenship’s boundaries 
according to Turkish nation-building process.
40
 In this context Tezcür analyzes 
the first years of the Republic by using Wimmer’s ethnic-boundary- making 
approach, emphasizing the process of nation-building rather than the ethnic or 
civic roots of Turkish nationalism.
41
 
 Wimmer claims that ethnicity is a living process of constituting and re-
constituting groups by defining the boundaries rather than relations between 
pre-defined, fixed groups.
42
 Consequently, Wimmer’s ethnic boundary making 
approach consists of five main strategies which are based on the alteration of 
the existing order of ethnicity: “to redraw a boundary by either expanding or 
limiting the domain of people included in one’s own ethnic category; to modify 
existing boundaries by challenging the hierarchical ordering of ethnic 
categories, or by changing one’s own position within a boundary system, or by 
emphasizing other, non-ethnic forms of belonging.”43 The first strategy which 
contains expansion of boundary is the exact theoretical description of Turkish 
nation-building; Wimmer already observes that the best-studied strategy of 
boundary expansion is the politics of nation-building.
44
Thus Tezcür argues that 
the Turkish case is compatible with the first variant of nation-building which is 
incorporation. Incorporation, “to redefine an existing ethnic group as the nation 
into which everybody should fuse”45, which is imposed from above by Turkish 
governing elites, designates the dominant Turkish culture and language and 
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prohibits the political and cultural representation of other ethnic identities like 
Kurdish.
46
    
 All scholars who study the nation-building process of Turkey focus on 
the imagined nature of Turkish nationality. Thus the governing elites as the 
ultimate locus of decision-making power are very dominant in this process; the 
evolution of Turkish nationalism continues in the direction of this nation-
building process almost for thirty years.  Hence the Kurdish issue has been 
discussed under different titles, for example as religious reaction, a 
manifestation of economic backwardness or the outcome of provocations of 
other countries. Mesut Yeğen classifies the discursive agenda of the Turkish 
state on the causes of the Kurdish problem under six titles: the explanation that 
denies the existence of Kurds as an ethnic group, the effect of sultanic rule and 
the caliphate’s supporters, the resistance of pre-modern formations like tribes, 
the provocations of other foreign countries, the alienation of Kurds and their 
construction as the “Other” and the impact of regional backwardness.47 These 
examples on the categorization of the Kurdish issue also indirectly reflect the 
episodes in the formation of Kurdish counter nationalism from the 1920’s to 
present-day. 
 The trajectory of Kurdish nationalism until 1990 can be analyzed as two 
separate episodes, namely 1923-1960 and 1960-1990. The foundation of the 
Turkish Republic and the indirect consequences of this in the form of political, 
cultural and ethnic constraints led the way to extraordinary social changes for 
Kurdish people. But the nature of Kurdish nationalism changed from a 
religious-based to an ideology-based one according to the internal conjuncture. 
1.2) Kurdish Nationalism 
The evolution of Kurdish nationalism is a coming together of various 
components. These components reflect the general trend of the time period 
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between 1923-1990. Konrad Hirschler points out that the transformation of the 
components from religious ties in the 1920’s and 1930’s to class components in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s and finally to ethnic ties in the 1990’s summarizes the 
whole adventure of Kurdish nationalism.
48
 Moreover the discursive shift of 
Turkey regarding the Kurdish issue could be observed according to same order. 
The binary classification of Kurdish nationalism as two time period, namely 
1923-1960 and 1960-1990 is an indication of the sharp distinction of Kurdish 
elites on the acting on the basis of religious and traditional affiliations to more 
class and ethnicity -based movements.  As mentioned, these two periods can be 
analyzed according to “The Classic Social Movement Agenda” because the 
theory is suitable to analyze the effects of new Turkish centralization and 
secularization efforts on the threat perceptions of both Kurdish notables and the 
Kurdish leftist mobilizing structures.  
1.2.1) 1923-1960 
The modernization reforms which were undertaken after 1923 started a 
process of political, cultural and economic change for local and tribal elites of 
the Kurdish regions. These social changes created political opportunities and 
constraints for the power holders of the region like cooperation against the state 
authority or the loss of political power. As in the case of the Classical Social 
Movement Agenda, the process consists of   mutual stages which have a cause 
and effect relationship. The 18 rebellions between 1924 and 1938, 16 of which 
involved Kurds
49
, were the examples of contentious interactions. All these 
rebellions by Kurdish tribal groups were perceived by new State as a counter-
attack against the political threats aroused by centralization and secularization 
reforms.     
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The new nation-state model caused the dissolution of the religious 
brotherhood among the Muslim nations of the Ottoman Empire, consequently 
damaging the domination of local powers. The rebels were organized to 
maintain the tribal structure in the region which was based on Islamic rules. 
However, although there is some consensus on the existence of religious 
motives in the 1925 Sheik Said Rebellion, the two other major rebellions, 
namely the 1930 Ağrı Rebellion and 1937 Dersim Rebellion, were considered 
as the reactions to the assimilative and statist policies of the Republic. All in 
all, the power struggle in the region was one of the most important 
determinants in the early stages of Kurdish nationalism. In line with this M. 
Hakan Yavuz
50
 and Mekin Mustafa Kemal Ökem51 call these early stages of 
Kurdish nationalism as “Kurdish proto-nationalism”.  
The first major rebellion that is the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion has a 
mythical character for Kurdish nationalism. However the nationalist character 
of the rebellion is still disputable. Most scholars question the nationalistic 
origins of the rebellion but there are exceptions. For example, Aybars argues 
that “Sheikh Said supposedly attempted to deceive the authorities by alleging 
that the rebellion was a religious one”.52 The religious and tribal allegiances 
played a major role in the formation of the Sheikh Said rebellion. But the 
religious character of the rebellion brought the ongoing disputes between Alevi 
and Sunni Kurds to the forefront. Yeğen claims that the above-mentioned fact 
resulted in the rejection of support from Alevi Kurds and consequently the 
defeat of Sheikh Said. The ad hoc Independence Tribunals which were created 
after the rebellion
53
 executed the leaders. The State authority preferred to 
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increase the level of repression. With the law for the Maintenance of Public 
Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) “the enemies of the new state” faced 
oppression instead of reconciliation. 
 The consequent rebellions in Ağrı and Dersim were repressed similarly 
and the measures taken were getting harsher with each new rebellion. On the 
one hand the Settlement Law of 1934 which was enacted just after the Ağrı 
rebellion divided the country in three zones: “Inhabited by those who spoke 
Turkish and were of Turkish ethnicity, inhabited by people whose culture and 
language should be enhanced by resettlement policies and the areas closed for 
security reasons to any form of civilian settlement”.54 The reasoning behind the 
law was “Turkification” policy. On top of the legislative measures, more 
symbolic measures were also taken like the renaming of Dersim as Tunceli. 
The renaming measure was the first sign of the future name “adjustments”. 
As we observe from the process mentioned above, the repertoires of 
contention between the rebels and the government created a vicious circle. 
With each new rebellion, more repressive measures were taken by the state. 
Instead of solving the problem, the new measures paved the way for new 
rebellions. Firstly, the changes in the status-quo in the region raised new 
political and social constraints for the tribal and religious elites; followed by 
the formation of organized rebellions for framing specific grievances and to 
mobilize the masses. But the mobilization efforts for Kurdish proto-nationalism 
failed, as a result of lack of grassroots support. Contrary to their aspirations, 
these rebellions strengthened the idea of Turkey’s “indivisibility of national 
integrity”55 and engendered a relatively long silent period for Kurdish 
nationalism until the 1960’s.  
 The twenty years between 1940 and 1960 are considered by all scholars 
as a peaceful period regarding the ethnic contention. While Kirişçi and 
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Winrow
56
 and Barkey and Fuller
57
 points to the lack of cooperation among 
Kurdish rebels as a result of the Turkish Republic’s success in repression, 
Ökem emphasizes the “emergence of an effective conservative opposition to 
the single–part era”.58 It is certain that the multiparty era changed the overall 
structure of Turkish political life because it exposed the existing political 
distinctions (Alevi and Sunni) between regional elites. 
 The high participation rates of three successive elections (1950, 1954 
and 1957)
59
 in fifteen provinces
60
 could be explained with the dominant role of 
feudal and tribal elites according to Özbudun.61 As it is the case with the 
success of CHP in these provinces when the tribal leaders had good relations 
with the state, the votes of DP rose in the 1954 election with the enlistment of 
the prominent family members in the region. Moreover the relative alleviation 
of repression in the region played an important role in the ideological shift of 
region and the prolonged cooperation between the Kurdish prominent families 
and the conservative right-wing parties. But the liberal policies of the DP were 
not sufficient to change the Kurdish perception of “the state” as the DP also 
enhanced a statist and pragmatist approach with the arrest of forty-nine 
Kurdish intellectuals (the event of 49’s) for participating in separatist and 
communist activities in 1959. While the ruling party could claim that they 
arrested the communists to avoid international and moderate Kurdish people’s 
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reaction, the members of government decided to exclude the Kurdish 
intellectuals one by one from Turkish political life in a meeting by Celal Bayar, 
Cevdet Sunay, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Adnan Menderes according to a report 
delivered by the chief of National Security’s Kurdish Problem Department, 
Ergun Gökdeniz.62 This policy was discontinued by the coup d’état in 1960. 
 The changing nature of Kurdish mobilization from rebellions to 
political representation is related with the repressive policies of the state and 
the cooperation with local notables.After the 1960 coup d’état, the national 
context paved the way for the acceleration of the social movements, 
particularly the development of an independent Kurdish nationalist political 
identity in the 1970’s. The Kurdish contention shifted from the struggle 
between the state and local power actors to left-wing movements, class-based 
politics through liberal environment after 1960 Constitution.
63
  
1.2.2) 1960-1989 
As a result of the social changes between 1950-1960, the Kurdish 
population became more educated, conscious and urbanized with a capacity to 
transform the nature of ethnic contention absolutely. While the social mobility 
through the 1961 liberal constitution caused the formation of a distinctive 
consciousness of Kurdish nationalism, the liberalization process engendered 
the emergence of a split between new marginal Kurdish elites and moderate 
local-tribal Kurdish leaders. This process went in hand with the rising leftist 
movements because the new marginal Kurdish elites, the future leaders of 
political parties, assumed an important role in these movements.  
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 The political division among the Kurds started in the 1960’s between 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Turkey (TKDP)
64
 and the Worker’s Party of 
Turkey (TIP). Despite the fact that they both tried to utilize the “Eastern 
problem” for political reasons, the ideological and numerical superiority made 
TIP more effective in Kurdish mobilization process. The TKDP which was 
founded by Said Elçi pushed for a more “peaceful, democratic, humanitarian” 
solution within the framework of republic. But TIP gained electoral legitimacy 
in 1965 with the election of fifteen deputies to Turkish National Assembly; and 
its Group of Easterners were Mehdi Zana, Tarık Ziya Ekinci, Kemal Burkay, 
had more representational power  than the traditionalists in TKDP.
65
 
The political power shift from tribal and traditional elites to urbanized 
Kurdish new leftist elites was assured through the environmental and relational 
mechanisms. The rise and urbanization of leftist ideology set the national 
environment for the collaboration between the Turkish left and Kurdish people 
(the mobilization of the latter) which would provide organizational 
coordination. For example the Eastern Meetings against economic 
backwardness and the traditional structure of the region, which were organized 
in 1967
66
, were supported only by TIP in the Turkish parliament. As a result of 
the above mentioned social consciousness, Kurdish associations were founded 
in big cities. The Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East (Devrimci Doğu 
Kültür Ocakları, DDKO’S) were founded in 1969 by the alliance of all Eastern 
cultural associations. The regular educational activities of DDKO’S; the 
leaders of which were active members of TIP, to which were aimed at raising 
Kurdish consciousness
67
 basically helped the formation of a new Kurdish 
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generation which was politically more active and marginal.  The members of 
DDKO’s were composed of the ex-cadres of DEV-GENÇ.68 This collaboration 
between Kurdish and Turkish associations would strengthen the politicization 
of Kurdish nationalism and consequently its distinctive nature as a new 
political movement. 
TİP discussed the Kurdish issue, naming it as “The Eastern problem” in 
its First Congress of 1964 and the party agreed that this was the result of 
Turkish chauvinistic nationalist, anti-democratic and repressive policies. The 
most important decision was the proclamation that the party would struggle for 
Kurdish citizenship rights. With the decisions of the Third Congress in 1968, 
which focused on the equality of citizens on all terms without any religious, 
ethnic or similar discrimination
69
, the former policy took on a more marginal 
shape. Finally the declaration of “the existence of a distinct Kurdish nation” in 
the Fourth Congress of TIP
70
 made the party the forerunner of subsequent 
Turkish political parties which mobilized on the basis of the politicization of 
Kurdish nationalism. But the monopoly of TİP in Turkish left related to 
Kurdish issue   ceased with the Kurdish dissociation from Turkish left and the 
organization of more nationalist mobilization structures like DDKO’S. This 
process of early politicization of Kurdish nationalism ended with the 1971 
coup because TIP and all associations including the DDKO’S, were outlawed.  
The shift to the left in Kurdish mobilization did not affect the loyal ties 
between the local Kurdish elites and the mainstream parties. The prominent 
families in the region, whose members were the supporters of the Democrat 
Party, continued to be the followers of the Justice Party, the successor to DP 
throughout the 1970’s. The conflict of interest has been in the political scene 
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since then. For example Necmettin Cevheri, Kamran İnan or Mehmet Celal 
Bucak were active politicians in the successor right mainstream parties. But the 
political decisions of the regional families were a determining factor in voter 
preferences. For example in Siverek the Bucaks voted for the Justice Party, the 
rival Kirvars for RPP or in Hilvan (near Urfa) Sulaymans supported the Justice 
Party, whereas the rival Paydar voted for RPP.
71
 Denise Natali observes this 
conflict of interest as “patronage links between the state and the local election 
machines”; she also underlines the communication gap with the Kurdish leftist 
groups and the pressure of local aghas to vote for certain parties. Furthermore 
David McDowall mentions the role of Bucaks, the local landlord clan in 
Siverek:  
“While the Bucak owner, Yüksel Erdal Oral looks after the family 
in Siverek, his father looks after the interests of the region and the Bucaks 
as a Senator in Ankara…Landowners like Yüksel are the (Justice) party’s 
link with the villages that would otherwise be well beyond its reach…On 
election day headmen and landlords round up villagers and take them to 
voting, Bucaks boast that they can deliver 8000 votes at the polls. With that 
kind of influence, the family virtually picks its own district representative 
in Ankara.”72 
As mentioned above, even if the local notables always secured the votes 
of mainstream political parties; they could not control the shift in the electoral 
dynamics of the region starting in the 1970’s. The most important reason of the 
shift was the new mobilization frames or coalitions which were the direct 
consequences of political fragmentation and socioeconomic 
transformations.
73
The cooperation with national left organizations, which 
provided the relational mechanism for a more class-based separate Kurdish 
political identity, has ultimately transformed the electoral behaviors in the 
region since the 1970’s. Dorronsoro and Watts observed the above mentioned 
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transformation of the electoral behavior in the regional voter tendency for 
independent candidates in the 1977 national and local elections. On the one 
hand they link the success of the independent candidates to the failure of local 
notables in cooperating with new organizational frames; on the other hand they 
emphasized the role of the new networks for independent candidates as in the 
case of Mehdi Zana’s election as the independent Mayor of Diyarbakır in 1977; 
with the support of Turkish Socialist Workers Party, KUK, TKSP, TÖB-Der.74 
Dorronsoro explained this change in the identity of the region’s representatives 
in another article  illustrating the decreasing percentage of deputies who 
mobilize the resources of what he calls “property” and “family notoriety” in the 
period of 1920-2002 from 100% in 1923 to 40% in 1970’s  and finally to 
almost 10%.
75
 
To sum up, the formation of a separate Kurdish “national” political 
identity was the direct consequence of two facts, namely the changes in the 
political consciousness of the region throughout the 1970’s and the new 
Kurdish social-political networks. These cognitive and relational mechanisms 
created a generation, that is the second Kurdish political generation in the 
Turkish Republic, the elites of which better represented the Kurdish people’s 
grievances than the first generation, that is local and traditional power holders, 
as well as underlining Kurdish nationalism  indirectly. The differences of these 
two generations in the politicization of Kurdish nationalism would be a marker 
in consecutive years because the emergence of new educated-urban political 
actors in the process and the struggle between traditional and modern Kurdish 
figures resulted in internal divisions. On the one hand, this process caused the 
radicalization of the contention; on the other hand it paved the way for the new 
actors like political parties.
76
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The process of the politicization of Kurdish nationalism continued in a 
more bipolar way until the founding of  political parties, because while Kurdish 
local notables were elected as deputies from the mainstream parties, the 
Kurdish left was divided into more radical fractions such as: “Liberation 
(Rızgari; also the name of the journal published in Kurdish language), the 
National Liberators of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtuluş) (KUK; separated 
from the TKDP in 1977), The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
77
 
The tendency of Kurdish local notables for participating in the politics 
of mainstream parties has multiple dimensions. It is obvious that the 
opportunities for personal advancement and the patron-client relationships 
which were secured with a seat in Ankara, were the ultimate causes of the 
collaboration. But this mutual collaboration which guarantied electoral gain in 
the region for mainstream parties also and relatively developed regional socio-
economic conditions. Furthermore, the parliamentary immunity was to be also 
an important motive for Kurdish elites after the coup d’état in 1980.78 Even if 
Kurdish notables were elected as independent as in the 1977 elections, some 
Kurdish politicians such as Eşref Cengiz, Ali Rıza Septioğlu, Nurettin Yılmaz 
and Abdülkerim Zilan79, they entered into mainstream parties for a safer socio-
political life. 
The intense polarization of Turkey in the period of 1971-1980 which 
intensified after the coup d’état in 1980 altered the political positioning of 
Kurdish people. As Kurdish “national” organizations became more clandestine 
and radicalized (like the PKK), the moderates like Ahmet Türk who chose to 
act with the CHP of Bülent Ecevit before 1980; took part in SHP which 
resulted from the merging of SODEP and HP. But some representatives of 
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Kurdish people were detained by the military rule for example, Şerafettin Elçi 
who was Minister of Public Works in Ecevit’s government in 1978-1979 and 
Mehdi Zana who was the independent mayor of Diyarbakır. Both were 
condemned because of their statements about Kurdishness. Hence Şerafettin 
Elçi declared “There are Kurds in Turkey, I am a Kurd too”80; and Mehdi Zana 
promised to “support the struggle of our (Kurdish) people against imperialism, 
fascism, colonialism, and feudal reactionaries” in his election manifesto.81 All 
in all, the coup d’état effected political streams in Kurdish politics but some 
local notables continued their political life in the right mainstream parties, like 
the Motherland and the Welfare Party without any risks of political detention. 
It is certain that the nature of contention changed from 1920’s to late 
1980’s. The poles were strictly defined between radicals, moderates and 
traditionals in this process. But as mentioned above, the Kurdish political 
demand started to concentrate on the recognition of a specific national identity 
in later years rather than the aggravated socio-economic conditions of the 
region or socialist struggle. Consequently the borders between the three poles 
were redrawn in favor of radicals because the moderates who supported 
mainstream parties especially SHP, decided to found a separate political party 
whose cadres would have more radical tones in contention. The separate 
political identity formation for Kurdish politics was directly related to the 
changes in the perception of Kurdish politicians in Turkish mainstream 
political parties and in the attitudes of these parties to Kurdish politicians. It 
was certain that mainstream parties like SHP could not frame the grievances of 
Kurdish politicians.   
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Chapter 2 Representative Contention 
 From the beginning the trajectory of representative contention is always 
determined according to the structural limits of the Turkish political system. 
The rising of an independent Kurdish nationalism did not engender political 
parties; instead the structural limits of the political space for Kurdish 
nationalist arguments paved the way for representative contention. Even if the 
Turkish political system gives the opportunity for Kurdish representatives in 
Turkish parliament, these are generally limited to Kurdish landlords and tribal 
leaders who consider the Kurdish issue within the economic and social 
determinism of the Turkish Republic. Hence the dissociation of Kurdish 
nationalism from traditional origins and the Turkish left at the same time 
transformed the identity of Kurdish parliamentarians beginning from 1970’s.  
 The successive mechanisms left its mark on the identity transformation 
of Kurdish parliamentarians indirectly by effecting the formation of legal 
Kurdish nationalism within the national political system. These mechanisms 
could reveal each step of the legal politicization of Kurdish nationalism, from 
the internal structural changes within the Turkish political system to the 
categorical dissociation of Kurdish parliamentarians afterwards or legal 
politicization of Kurdish nationalism with its entry to Turkish Parliament. The 
major external mechanism was the International Paris Conference the theme of 
which was “The Kurds: human rights and cultural identity”. It was held on 14th 
and 15
th
 October 1989
82
 and it was the beginning of the end for the majority of 
Kurdish parliamentarians and mainstream parties, especially SHP. Even if this 
could be observed as an external mechanism; it could be also analyzed as a 
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cognitive and relational mechanism. As the relational ties between the new 
Kurdish leftist elites and European authorities strengthened through the rising 
consciousness of Kurdish nationalism which was one of the indirect 
consequences of changing national and international political environment. The 
changing national and international political environment could be explained 
with the existence of relatively transformative national actors in Kurdish issue 
such as SHP and Özal and the rising international importance of Kurds after 
the First Gulf War.   
 The conference which was organized by the Kurdish Institute of Paris 
and the France Libertés Foundation, hosted bureaucrats, statesmen and 
academicians related to Kurdish rights from all over the world.
83
 The guest list 
from Turkey was not limited to deputies, and contained Turkish residents in 
France and intellectuals.
84
Despite the widespread participation, the most 
striking point was the participation of SHP’s Kurdish deputies and it was a 
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turning point for Turkish political life and ensured directly the foundation of 
the first political party who would try to appeal Kurdish rights, HEP. 
 At the initial stage, Erdal İnönü, the leader of SHP, authorized the 
participation of four deputies. The decision to authorize participation was given 
in a quartet meeting with the presence of Erdal İnönü, Deniz Baykal, Ahmet 
Türk and Cumhur Keskin.85 Then SHP Central Committee took the decision 
that the participation to a conference which specifically demands the promotion 
of Kurdish identity could not be legitimized in Turkish public opinion. 
Consequently SHP administration adopted a position against deputy 
participation. But Mahmut Alınak claimed that the Kurdish deputies were not 
informed about this decision except Ahmet Türk.86 Finally seven deputies; 
Ahmet Türk, Adnan Ekmen, Salih Sümer, Mahmut Alınak, Kenan Sönmez, 
İsmail Hakkı Önal and Mehmet Ali Eren87 participated in the conference but 
preferred not to address the conference. The only exception was İbrahim Aksoy 
who was expelled from SHP after his speech in February 1989 in the Turkish-
European Joint Parliamentary Commission.
88
 İbrahim Aksoy’s declaration was 
particularly about the Turkey and it was named “The situation in Turkish 
Kurdistan”. However the final declaration of the Conference was mostly on the 
situation of Kurdish communities all over the world. The decisions taken 
included both social and political demands. Hence human rights issues and 
refugee problems as well as; the proposition of a special session in UN devoted 
to Kurdish problems and the founding of a permanent Kurdish institution for 
representation in international organizations were considered.
89
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 Two points were clear after the International Conference. First of all, it 
provided international certification for Kurdish struggle in all countries. 
Secondly, the SHP membership of the seven who took part in the conference 
came to an end. All of them were expelled by the disciplinary committee on 
17
th
 November after a decision which was taken by majority of votes (5-4) on 
the basis of the decision of Central Committee on 17
th
 October.
90
 The reason of 
expulsion was based on the articles in Party crimes section of the internal 
statue of SHP; these were “behaving contrary to the decision of the general 
assembly, committee and other organs and the decrees of the program and by 
laws”91 and “contributing to political actions contrary to the basic principles 
and direction of the party”.92 But this expulsion created new political 
opportunities for Kurdish parliamentarians within the Turkish political system. 
 The new political opportunities which were triggered by SHP in two 
directions, both positively and negatively, paved the way for the first political 
party HEP. At the same time, Özal as a prominent political figure secured the 
existence of Kurdish “legal” representation by his liberal policies. But the 
naming of the “legal” politicization of Kurdish nationalism as representative 
contention could only be explained by the radical domination of PKK of the 
Kurdish issue; consequently it affected the political identity of Kurdish 
parliamentarians. Additionally the ascending power of PKK can be explained 
by the international structural changes in Northern Iraq after the First Gulf war. 
The struggle which started just after the expulsion of “socialist” deputies of 
SHP transformed into an ethnic contention and gained a more radical tone 
through the structural changes in Turkish political life and the PKK.  
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2.1) HEP 
The first political party, namely HEP, was founded as a result of the 
conflict within SHP following the expulsion of seven Kurdish deputies. The 
efforts of some deputies in SHP
93
 which were considered as the representatives 
of leftist ideology in the party were not sufficient to convince Erdal İnönü and 
Deniz Baykal to forgive the participant deputies. Moreover the local branches 
of the party in the region
94
 claimed that the expulsion could damage the local 
interests of the party.
95
 The reactions of intra-party supporters, especially the 
deputies, focused on the undemocratic character of the decision rather than the 
rights of Kurdish people. Consequently the resignation of twelve deputies
96
 
from SHP was the result of a search for a more leftist and democratic political 
party than SHP. The resignations continued with regional SHP administrators 
(12 provincial chairmen) and 3000 rank and file party members.
97
 
All members of the opposition within the party, including seven 
expelled deputies, constituted the political group of New Democratic 
Formation (Yeni Demokratik Oluşum). On the one hand the Conference in 
Paris as an environmental mechanism caused the creation of a heterogeneous 
group, namely New Democratic Formation; on the other hand the existence of 
people like Aydın Güven Gürkan, Fehmi Işıklar with the capability to broker 
differences accelerated the process of the formation of a party. There were two 
important declarations of the Formation. Firstly, the cadres of the Formation 
underlined that they would introduce socialist ideology in the political arena. 
Secondly, in the Declaration of Political Intentions of 12
th
 January 1990, they 
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made it clear that their aim was to evolve into a democratic socialist party 
which would adopt egalitarian values.  This compromise on the principles of 
socialism appealed even to political figures like Kemal Anadol, Hüsnü 
Okçuoğlu and Kamil Ateşoğulları who were considering founding a Marxist 
party.
98
 But the socialist ideological glue was not sufficient to keep together 
Kurdish parliamentarians and the “socialist” group of SHP. This became 
evident after its first assembly on 3 March 1990, when mainly the Kurdish 
supporters of the Formation attended the meeting. But Aydın Güven Gürkan 
who was considered as the leader of the prospective party, mentioned the 
importance of the Kurdish issue and underlined that this problem had to be 
solved thorough democratic means.
99
 Even if the cadres of the Formation 
attempted to reduce the dominant Kurdish character of the movement, the 
pressure of the Kurdish community to frame ethnic grievances in the first 
Kurdish party was a natural outcome; hence despite all attempts, the Kurdish 
character was dominant. Thus the socialism-oriented members; even Aydın 
Güven Gürkan, broke with the New Democratic Formation. But the rest of the 
cadres, which was mainly composed of Kurdish representatives; decided to 
establish a mass-party; on these grounds they appointed Fehmi Işıklar (the ex-
General Secretary of DISK)
100
 as the Chairman of the party. Eleven deputies
101
 
gave a petition to the Interior Ministry to found HEP
102
 on 7 June 1990.
103
 The dissociation of socialist deputies from the new party caused the 
definitive categorical formation in Turkish political life. Even if HEP was 
founded with the aim of being a mass party; the boundaries of the new party 
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were redrawn in line with the agenda which differed from the ordinary political 
programs and involved non-conventional methods within the Parliament. The 
difference between mass parties and the newly founded HEP is the main 
rationale behind Nicole Watts’ thesis, naming the representational repertoires 
of ethno-political parties as representative contention: 
“In cases such as Turkey, restrictions on popular protest may in 
fact channel activism into the political system, where pressure “from 
below”(popular protest and ballot box) and “outside”(militant contention) 
can encourage activists who gain office to maintain a radical tone and 
action despite the potential risks. Similarly, some of the tactics adopted by 
pro-Kurdish activist-politicians were drawn directly from “non-
conventional” protest repertoires including hunger strikes, cross-country 
symbolic marches and funeral demonstrations…”104 
 The first contentious action of HEP was to launch the cross-country 
symbolic march for “Proud and Independent Life” beginning on 17thof July 
1990 in İstanbul and ending in Diyarbakır, followed with a public meeting. 
HEP provided both local and national legitimacy through the enthusiasm of the 
community during the march in spite of the clashes between Kurdish people 
and security forces. Even if the all actions of HEP could not be qualified as 
contentious, they were not compatible in general with the government’s 
policies as the demonstrations of “No War” in different cities of Turkey which 
were organized by HEP regarding Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait and a 
probable big war showed.
105
 These contentious actions could not naturally 
legitimize the party in Kurdish community because they had to act in spite of 
PKK and the constraints of the Turkish political system. The Newroz 
celebration in 1991 offered an opportunity to HEP, but the categorical 
settlement became distinctive with the radical attitudes of the participants to 
the celebration like     taking down of the Turkish flag. Furthermore the 
declaration of HEP’s Chairman Fehmi Işıklar in the first congress of the party 
on 8-9 June 1991 exposed the pro-Kurdish character of the party: 
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 “HEP,whose party is it? It is the party of most oppressed and 
exploited ones. And who are they? People who claim that HEP is a pro-
Kurdish party despite all my declarations, admit that this country’s most 
oppressed and exploited people are Kurds.”106    
   
The constraints of the Turkish political system, especially the electoral laws 
which demanded   the establishment of offices in at least half of the country’s 
seventy four provinces and a nationwide congress a minimum of six months 
prior to elections, prevented HEP from competing in elections. Consequently 
HEP’s cadres began to look for electoral alliances with mainstream political 
parties, namely the Welfare Party and SHP.
107
 
 HEP’s electoral alliance with SHP was beneficial for both of them. 
While HEP overcame the electoral laws, SHP had a new opportunity to regain 
the regional votes which were lost after Kurdish parliamentarians were 
expelled the party. Despite the apparent benefits, the alliance decision was very 
controversial for HEP’s cadres. Osman Ölmez called the anti-alliance group as 
“Libertarians” which was led by İbrahim Aksoy. Ölmez underlined that this 
group was for independent candidates for the 1991 elections; furthermore he 
added that they stood for 1991 elections separately as seven independent 
candidates.
108
 But the electoral alliance became a definite plan with the efforts 
of Hikmet Çetin and Fikri Sağlar from SHP and Fehmi Işıklar from HEP. The 
HEP members became the members of SHP on 5 September 1991 after their 
symbolic expulsion from HEP.
109
 The electoral alliance was accomplished; 
Erdal İnönü even described this as “not merely an electoral alliance” but “a 
step toward party integration”.110 SHP reserved fourteen nominations in their 
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lists for HEP members but HEP’s intention was to get almost thirty five 
members in the lists. When the elections were held on 20th October 1991, eight 
additional ex-HEP members, on top of the planned fourteen candidates by 
SHP, were elected
111
as a result of the preferential voting system. Nicole Watts 
explains the perspective of HEP as “solving the Kurdish problem through 
peaceful and democratic methods in line with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the statutes of 
the Helsinki Document” with a quotation from HEP’s program and highlighted 
the one-paged devotion to the Kurdish problem in the program which shows 
HEP’s intention of being a mass party. However she accentuated the lack of 
national political experience of fifteen deputies and the local power ties of 
these deputies, naming Mehdi Zana’s wife Leyla Zana or Şemdin Sakık’s (a 
leading figure of PKK) brother Sırrı Sakık.112 This differentiation during the   
parliamentarization of HEP could be observed as a shift from local domination 
to national representation
113
; it could also demonstrate the cadre alteration and 
radicalization of parliamentarian Kurdish nationalism. Thus “representative 
contention” gained its real meaning in the oath-taking ceremony of the 19th 
legislation term on 6 November 1991. 
 According to Mahmut Alınak, the meeting among HEP members before 
the oath-taking ceremony devised an action plan. He claimed that they agreed 
on Fehmi Işıklar’s Turkish message and Abdülkerim Zilan’s Kurdish message 
during the ceremony.
114
 But while Hatip Dicle started with the statement, “I 
and my friends are reading this text under Constitutional pressure” and 
continued with some additions to the original oath, Leyla Zana finished her 
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oath by a Kurdish sentence which meant “I take this oath for the brotherhood 
between the Turkish people and the Kurdish people”.115 Furthermore all 
Kurdish deputies had some accessories with PKK’s colors116. This was the 
beginning of the end for the alliance between the Kurdish deputies and SHP, 
because SHP, as a coalition partner in the 49th government, could not bear the 
responsibility of having Kurdish members against political reactions. The 
successive contentious actions of Kurdish deputies complicated the 
consolidation process. All in all, the radicalization process was escalating
117
 
and so did the pressure of SHP on Hatip Dicle and Leyla Zana to resign. This 
mutual pressure came to an end with SHP’s petition of exclusion for Hatip 
Dicle on 10
th
 January 1992 in its Disciplinary Committee. Following the 
petition, Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle decided to resign for the purpose of “not 
damaging SHP’s opening politics” on 16th January 1992.118 But fourteen more 
deputies
119
 resigned on 31th March 1992 after they had agreed that SHP could 
not keep its promises on lifting the emergency rule. The fact that pulled the 
trigger is the decision prolonging the emergency rule for another four months 
period. It is certain that the 1992 Newroz celebrations also played an important 
role in the resignations. 110 persons were killed in spite of Demirel’s tolerant 
explanation for celebration, because the emergency rule authorities outlawed 
all kind of action.
120
  
 The deputies who resigned from SHP chose to establish a new party 
instead of returning to HEP. ÖZEP was founded on 25th June 1992 by 
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following the example of HEP. To remind, HEP started off with the New 
Democratic Formation, then turned into a political party. However the process 
was not sustainable; and ÖZEP cadres decided to merge with HEP on 7th July 
2002. But the merge was not beneficial for Kurdish parliamentarians; the 
closure case against HEP began in July 1992 which based on charges of 
separatism and threatening the unity of the nation-state.
121
 This was the start of 
the vicious cycle for political parties in Turkey. ÖZDEP which was founded as 
a precaution to a probable closure of HEP could operate only for one year, 
from October 1992 to November 1993. The Public Prosecutor’s Office filed a 
closure suit based on party program’s separatist agenda.122 But the process for 
Kurdish parliamentarians began almost six months before the closure case; the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office sent the summary of investigation (fezleke) to the 
parliament for the suspension of membership of twenty-two Kurdish deputies 
on 26th December 1991.
123
 Despite the short membership period, they 
managed to carry out a sit-in protest in the parliament on the 1st of July for one 
day to draw attention to unresolved cases of murders, unemployment, violence 
and bombings in the Southeast.
124
 
 The national legitimacy of Kurdish deputies by the Turkish Parliament 
was a consequence of the parliamentarization process of legal Kurdish 
nationalism. This national legitimacy with the power of electoral immunity 
brought in the experience of contentious politics for deputies. The first request 
of the prosecutor which was sent on 2 April 1992, was not even responded to 
by the Speaker of Parliament, Hüsamettin Cindoruk because of the description 
of the parliament as a shelter for PKK members. Then a second one was 
rejected by Cindoruk on the grounds that the freedom of the rostrum and 
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freedom of speech for deputies cannot be breached. But while Cindoruk was 
serving as acting President, Yılmaz Hocaoğlu, acting Speaker of the 
Parliament, sent the request to the parliament’s joint Justice and Constitutional 
Commission on 21 May 1992. The bureaucratic process that the petition 
followed finally ended in 1994 and came to the voting of Parliament. The 
suspension of the membership will be analyzed in the following sections; for 
now it is important to underline that on the one hand the parliamentary 
protection shows the importance of “legalism” for Kurdish nationalism; on the 
other hand it exposes the political limits for Kurdish parliamentarians. Who 
provided this parliamentarian protection to HEP and on what grounds?  Also 
what pushed them to contentious actions consequently to an identity shift 
through radicalization?  
2.2) Transformative Actors for Kurdish Politics 
 The trajectory of Kurdish nationalism began at the level of social 
mobilization in the 1960’s while the Kurdish deputies in main-stream political 
parties were keeping their secured place in Turkish political life. But the 
process changed with the emergence of HEP; the brokerage which was led by 
HEP brought all the “nationalist” Kurdish deputies together. This led to the 
categorical finalization for parties in Turkish political life as Kurdish ethnic 
political parties. The consolidation of “nationalist” Kurdish cadres under the 
shelter of  one party, namely HEP, paved the way for legitimization of Kurdish 
nationalism and consequently  parliamentarization provided a political space 
where they could frame their ethnic grievances effectively. On the one hand, 
national actors like SHP, through the electoral alliance with HEP, and Özal 
provided political opportunities for Kurdish parliamentarians for framing these 
ethnic grievances; on other hand, PKK would always be an undeniable factor 
for parliamentarian Kurdish nationalism in its political movements because of 
their common target public. Each of them played important roles in the identity 
transformation of Kurdish parliamentarians in both directions, positive and 
negative. While SHP and Özal tried to create a democratic environment for 
HEP at the beginning, the political limitations of Turkish political life 
 40 
complicated the politicization process of Kurdish nationalism and PKK made 
the circumstances even more difficult for political parties.    
2.2.1) As a Party SHP 
 “SHP had tried to be all things to all men” was a quotation which was 
used by David McDowall for describing the relationship between SHP and the 
regional representatives.
125
 SHP could be perceived as the unhappy marriage of 
“center-left Turkish intellectuals and the workers on one hand” and 
“mainstream Marxists and Kurds on the other”.126 Consequently the party’s 
approach to the Kurdish problem focused particularly on democratic rights 
arguments, such as the lifting of the emergency rule, the extension of Kurdish 
cultural rights in schools and in public, or the elimination of the village guard 
system. Moreover the party applied to the Constitutional Court to dispute the 
legality of Decree 413 which envisaged “giving the governor –general 
sweeping powers to recommend the closure of any publishing house anywhere 
in Turkey that falsely reflects events in the region or engages in untruthful 
reporting or commentary”, but the ANAP government substituted it with 
Decree 424 later.
127
 SHP essentially published a report in July 1990, “SHP’s 
Perspective on Eastern and Southeastern Problems and Solutions” which was 
planned in the annual meeting of SHP in November 1989.
128
 The report was 
the summary of SHP’s perspective on the Kurdish problem because the 
dimensions of the problem in the report were limited to the lack of democracy, 
human rights and socio-economic problems. Therefore their solutions were 
directly aimed at the socio-economic underdevelopment of the region and the 
brutal consequences of the emergency rule. It was certain that selecting Deniz 
Baykal, the General Secretary of the Party from center-leftist side and Hikmet 
Çetin, a Kurdish deputy from Lice as the members of preparatory commission, 
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could be considered as a precaution for a more democracy based report rather 
than an ethnic-based one. It was of course SHP that actually took the decision 
to expel the Kurdish deputies, but this was a decision imposed by the 
limitations of Turkish political life to SHP. Nicole Watts underlined that the 
charge directed at the participants to the conference was that “they had 
transgressed the often-unspoken limits of free expression”. The political risks 
and the repercussions of attending the conference were more massive than the 
amount the deputies were ready to accept and as a result it was an important 
setback for the political resolution of the Kurdish problem. 
The electoral alliance in the 1991 elections, as mentioned above, was a 
pragmatic decision for both parties, namely HEP and SHP. While SHP was 
gaining its lost votes after the expulsions, HEP gained the opportunity to enter 
the Parliament. But it turned out to be harmful for both parties after the famous 
oath-taking ceremony. SHP got enormous reactions from main-stream political 
parties. For example Bülent Ecevit, chairman of the Democratic Left Party told 
Cumhuriyet; 
 “If the HEP had been able to enter the election on its own, I would 
not have seen this as any cause for concern. In a situation in which a party 
encouraging separatist trends is united with the main opposition party, it is 
inevitable that it will influence the policy of the main opposition party.”129 
It was certain that the democratic agenda of SHP for regional development 
would be a matter of discussion in coalition meetings with the other partner 
DYP. As a result of these discussions, the new coalition envisaged cultural 
diversity by referring to Paris Charter and Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in the government program
130
. Additionally Erdal 
İnönü’s call for the recognition of the cultural identity of Turkey’s Kurdish 
citizens in December 1991 and Süleyman Demirel’s declaration of the 
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recognition of Kurdish reality on 8 December 1991 created a positive 
atmosphere.
131
 
 “We are talking about a Kurdish identity. It is not possible to object this 
anymore. Turkey must recognize Kurdish reality. Nobody can claim that a 
person is not Kurd, but a Turk, and that we get off together from Central Asia 
and our languages changed on the way. We founded this state together. When 
Ottoman Empire dissolved, there were two groups left, Turks and Kurds. Our 
state is unitary, there is no minority. We are all owners of this country. Citizen, 
who speaks Kurdish in Turkey, is also an equal member of this community. 
That is the way we have to approach issue”.132  
 
 But these rhetorical declarations would not be sufficient to alter the socio-
economic conditions of the region after years of suppression and violence.
133
 
Moreover the renewal of the emergency rule and the 1992 Newroz chaos 
exposed the failure of the new theoretical policy of the coalition. According to 
Graham Fuller and Henri Barkey, these simple theoretical shifts of SHP 
continued inconsistently in the following two coalitions with DYP between 
1991 and 1996. The unification of SHP and CHP in 1995 did not change the 
party’s characteristics and cadres. Even if the party was criticized for being 
passive on the Kurdish problem; actually the limitations of the political system 
in Turkey did not give many opportunities to national political actors. For 
example CHP member Algan Hacaloğlu, the Minister of State for Human 
Rights, was threatened by special team personnel in the region.  
 All in all, SHP’s rhetorical democratization efforts were materialized at 
least partly with the entry of HEP in the Turkish Parliament. But its prospective 
political activities in the Parliament were overshadowed mostly by the 
contentious actions of its Kurdish deputies like the oath-taking ceremony and 
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legal examinations such as personal inspections, the closing down of the 
parties…etc. conditioned by the limits of political system. But the first political 
party could start a dialogue with Turgut Özal through the First Gulf War 
conditions and his liberal approach. 
2.2.2) As a Political Actor ÖZAL 
Turgut Özal was the most prominent political leader of the liberal 
approach to the Kurdish problem. It was clear that the internal and international 
conjuncture paved the way for liberalization, but he took the lead among 
mainstream parties. ANAP’s cadre structure was also determining factor in 
Özal’s approach to the Kurdish problem. As ANAP put forth Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis in the first election after the coup d’état, Özal especially targeted 
Kurdish Sufi networks through highlighting his Naqshbandiyya origins.
134
 
Furthermore he declared that he was partially Kurdish in June 1989. Despite 
his liberal approach, he was responsible for the most brutal politics in region, 
namely the village guard system and the emergency rule. On the one hand he 
tried to keep the control pragmatically against rising PKK by rough measures; 
on the other hand he searched for a diplomatic solution with Northern Iraq and 
politic solution with HEP deputies. The Village Law of April 1985 envisaged 
the creation of “temporary village guards” which would serve as “local militia” 
against terrorists.
135
 Even if it was planned as a “temporary” solution, they are 
still one of the most brutal tools that the state uses. Furthermore the 
government declared a state of emergency in 1987 under Turgut Özal’s 
premiership.
136
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 Özal’s presidency was an important period that shifted the paradigm of 
the Kurdish problem in Turkey because his presidency coincided first of all 
with the foundation of the first party who tries to appeal Kurdish rights in the 
Parliament and secondly, the First Gulf War. The Iraqi-Kurdish rebels against 
Saddam created a flux of Kurdish refugees after the end of the First Gulf War, 
who were chased to the mountains along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The 
National Security Council which did not want another refugee crisis as the one 
after Halabja Massacre
137
 decided to wait for a UN decision. Furthermore 
Kamuran İnan, the Minister of State, emphasized that “The world did nothing 
then to help us shelter and feed the refugees…at the outset of the 1991 crisis;  
in April, the Turkish government decided not to repeat what they saw as their 
mistake in 1988”.138 But any UN decision, which was based on Özal’s safe 
haven, could not be possible without Soviet, Chinese and Indian votes. 
Consequently the safe zone was created by the USA on 16
th
 April 1991 around 
Zakhu. The Operation Provide Comfort provided the necessary humanitarian 
aid in 20 camps for refugees in the 36
th
 parallel.
139
 Even if Özal’s ideas were 
not directly applied through UN, Turkish government managed to solve the 
issue more peacefully for its internal Kurdish politics. Hereafter Özal met 
regularly with Kurdish leaders which were thankful for the protection given 
after the First Gulf War. Moreover Celal Talabani, the leader of PUK (Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan), assumed the role of intermediary for the cease-fire 
agreement in 1993 as it would be the case with the HEP representatives. 
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 It is certain that Turgut Özal was the prominent leader of the new 
paradigm in the Kurdish problem; he sent a draft bill to repeal the Law 2932
140
 
in April 1991 to allow the use of Kurdish language in broadcasts, publications 
and education.
141
 But he promoted an Anti-Terrorism Law which defined 
terrorism as “any kind of action …with the aim of changing the characteristics 
of the Republic” on 12th April 1991. Compared his predecessors, he was a 
more active President. While he was trying to intervene in the Kurdish problem 
with laws, he stayed in control through the dialogues with Kurdish actors like 
Celal Talabani and HEP’s representatives. As a result the Kurdish leader 
Talabani initiated a mediation process between the PKK and Turkey. PKK 
declared cease-fire for a month which started on 20th March 1993. In addition 
to Talabani’s efforts, Özal’s meetings with HEP deputies (Orhan Doğan, 
Mahmut Alınak and Selim Sadak) first in late 1992 and then just before 1993 
Newroz paved the way for the decision of the PKK because Özal convinced the 
deputies to the necessity of a cease-fire. All in all, the renewal of the cease-fire 
was declared by Öcalan in April 1993 with the participation of all Kurdish 
leaders including Ahmet Türk, the chairman of HEP, the HEP deputies Hatip 
Dicle, Sedat Yurtdaş, Sırrı Sakık, Orhan Doğan and Feridun Yazar.142Ahmet 
Türk emphasized Özal’s liberal approach in his defense in the closure case by 
referring to their greetings by Turkey Embassy’s Undersecretary in Syria and 
meetings with Ambassador of Turkey in Damascus just before the renewal 
declaration of the cease-fire with Öcalan in Damascus.143 The whole process 
was interrupted by the sudden death of Turgut Özal on 17th April 1993. PKK, 
unsatisfied with the measures taken by Turkey after the cease-fire, launched an 
attack at Bingöl which caused 33 unarmed soldiers’ deaths.144 
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 Turkish power holders, especially the military, perceived PKK’s cease-
fire declaration as a clear sign that PKK was defeated and exacerbated their 
operations in the region. On the other hand, Tansu Çiller, who was elected as 
Prime Minister after Demirel’s Presidency, had liberal ideas like education and 
broadcasting in Kurdish. But the hardliners in the party like Coşkun Kırca 
dominated the Kurdish issue. Additionally, Demirel who approved the 
existence of “Kurdish reality” just a year ago claimed that “unless terrorism is 
solved, cultural issues cannot be debated”.145 Çiller did not hesitate to use the 
Kurdish issue in her 1994 local elections campaign with the slogan of “PKK 
out of Parliament” for the suspension of the Kurdish deputy’s immunities; all 
democratization proposals (July 1993 and May 1994) of SHP including 
education in Kurdish, radio and television broadcasting in Kurdish were 
refused by their coalition partner under the pretext of the existence of terror. 
SHP succeeded to add amendments to the Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law in 
1994 for narrowing the definition of separatist propaganda to enlarge the 
party’s political space. But the 1995 national election results were a total 
disappointment for mainstream parties in the region because the votes were 
divided in two distinctive poles, HADEP and RP.
146
 
 DYP’s militarist approach in the Kurdish issue was very important in 
the election process of candidates; they replaced the traditional Kurdish 
candidates with individuals whose the origins were not Kurdish. Even if 
Motherland party would host almost all traditional Kurdish deputies like 
Kamran İnan or Şerif Bedirhanoğlu, Mesut Yılmaz could not address the issue 
consistently after Özal had been elected as the President of the Republic. While 
he was favoring the social and cultural dimension of the Kurdish problem in 
1994, he opposed a report published by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce 
and Commodity about governmental policies in the region in 1995. Mesut 
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Yılmaz’s ANAP was not as successful as Özal’s.147 Their votes declined 
steadily with every new election, but what really jogged the dominance of the 
mainstream parties in the region is the rivalry of the pro-Kurdish parties and 
the ascension of Islamist parties.  
 Özal and SHP tried to liberalize the Turkish statist approach in Kurdish 
issue however the boundaries of the political system limited their action plan. 
Both played the brokerage role for integrating pro-Kurdish political parties to 
Turkish political life; they supported their struggle for social and cultural rights 
at the national level. But the acceptance of politicization of Kurdish 
nationalism as a country-wide problem did not bring direct positive 
consequences for Kurdish people; on the contrary they were encouraged to turn 
to more contentious actions because of the unspoken limits of Turkish politics. 
These contentious actions caused parties to be labeled as radicals like PKK’s 
members. Therefore it was not possible for parties to deal in politics without 
any PKK emphasis. PKK is the other political figure which is as important as 
SHP and Özal in the trajectory of the politicization of Kurdish nationalism. 
While SHP and Özal paved the way for the parliamentarization and integration 
of pro-Kurdish political parties, PKK should be observed as an armed 
organization which prevents the normalization of party’s politics.  
2.2.3) As an Organization PKK 
“It would be incorrect to assume that the PKK is simply a military 
cum terrorist organization. No nationalist movement has ever achieved as 
much as the PKK has without recourse to political activism and 
preparation. The group’s military prowess has only made it easier to 
organize politically. The PKK is at first and foremost a political 
organization with distinct political objectives that employs violence, often 
extensively and even erroneously from its own standpoint. This violence is 
basically secondary to its fundamental character; while this does not imply 
that violence is unimportant for the PKK, it does not mean that violence is 
used to define and pursue political objectives.”148 
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A paragraph written by Graham Fuller and Henri Barkey; a simple 
character description of PKK. But Turkey always undertook PKK as a terrorist 
organization even they reached an agreement indirectly with PKK about cease-
fire as mentioned above.  
PKK emerged with Kurdish dissociation from Turkish leftist 
organizations in late 1970’s. The leadership of Abdullah Öcalan was decided in 
first Congress of PKK in 1978. The 1980 military coup d’état put on the spot 
all kinds of organizations, especially the Kurdish ones, thus the organization’s 
leaders went to training camps in Syria and Lebanon.
149
 
At first PKK was described as a Marxist-Leninist organization which 
struggled against imperialism, especially Turkish imperialism. But the leftist 
character of PKK was losing its popularity, and; the nationalist emphasis 
gained importance. Fuller and Barkey claimed that this ideology shift was 
related directly with the ascendance of Islamic parties in the region. 
Furthermore they affirmed that PKK which started violent acts in 1984 for “the 
creation of a unified, independent Kurdish state” moderated their political 
demands by demanding a political settlement within the existing borders of 
Turkey in the middle of 1990’s.150 In fact these years were the most brutal 
period of the struggle, with; 5,104 civilian, 11,546 PKK, 3,621 military 
personnel deaths just between 1992-1995.
151
 Civilian deaths figures rose over 
the years because the first target of PKK which was military presence in the 
region could not be sufficient enough to promote PKK’s cause; teachers and 
ordinary Kurds had been the “collateral damages” of the struggle.  The reason 
for so many civilian deaths was the belief in both sides that violence was the 
most effective way for a resolution of the Kurdish question. While the state 
adopted brutal measures such as emergency rule, the Anti-Terror Law of April 
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1991 or the village guard system; PKK raided the villages that were situated 
near the Turkish borders with Iraq and Iran. This situation led to a more brutal 
policy by the state, namely village evacuation. The numbers of evacuations 
reached 2,253 in October 1995. The villages were caught in the crossfire 
between PKK and Turkish military. For example a village headman   described 
the situation; “slaves of the military during day time and slaves of PKK at 
night.”152 
The brutal struggle in the Southeastern region of the country costed 
more than the financial expenditures of security because violence, especially 
the existence of emergency rule with super local governors, increased ethnic 
consciousness in the region and created a generation who were raised in this 
violent environment. The PKK was considered as a sole resort for them in the 
absence of any powerful political alternatives. The State exacerbated the 
situation by limiting the opportunities for the political representation of legal 
Kurdish nationalism. 
Öcalan approached cautiously the formation of a political party; but he 
declared his support for the party. Therefore the political base of PKK started 
to get into HEP. But both organizations, PKK and HEP, wanted to stay distant 
from each other. Murat Dağdelen emphasized the impossibility of this type of 
distance as a “representative” of Öcalan in the party. Öcalan tried to stay in 
control through his agents in HEP; HEP overlooked this because any 
condemnation of PKK could result in the loss of its electoral base.
153
 It was a 
win-win situation for both parties. While the PKK observed the prospective 
actions of “legal” nationalism in the Parliament, HEP took the advantage of 
PKK support for elections in the region even though all the deputies did not 
approve of the PKK. But the disapproval in Turkish political life pushed 
Kurdish deputies to more radical actions; consequently each successor party 
would be more radical than the previous one. For example Hatip Dicle, a 
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Kurdish deputy from DEP declared regarding the PKK bombing of Tuzla train 
station which five military student deaths that anyone who wore uniforms was 
a target. As political parties were prevented by political system in Turkey 
under the pretext of being PKK’s political arm; they were getting closer to 
PKK.  
The political parties have been in crossfire between the state and PKK. 
As the state pushes political parties out of the system, they are obliged to 
cooperate with PKK because of its monolithic domination of the Kurdish issue. 
This monolithic domination could not even be challenged with the “legal” 
politicization of Kurdish nationalism, but political parties became the 
permanent opposition actors of Turkish political life. The monolithic 
dominance of PKK cannot be explained only with the success of the 
organization; the international conjuncture which emerged after the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq and during the First Gulf War paved the way for a federated 
Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. While this change provided PKK territorial and 
organizational opportunity along the borders of Turkey, the Iraqi Kurdish issue 
became an international matter. Consequently the approach of Turkish state to 
Northern Iraq which based only on military solutions, evolved into a more 
diplomatic one with the new status of Iraqi Kurdish leaders. 
2.2.4) As a International Context Northern Iraq 
 The struggle of Iraqi Kurds for autonomy in Iraq has continued since 
English colonial rule; Sheikh Mahmut Berzenci rioted three times against 
English colonial power between 1919 and 1932. The struggle continued with 
Sheikh Ahmet Barzani in 1931. Then Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the founder of 
Kurdistan Democratic Party and the younger brother of Sheikh Ahmet Barzani 
was the prominent figure of the rebellions during the Second World War in 
Iraq
154
 but he escaped Iran where he helped Iranian Kurds to govern Kurdish  
Republic of  Mahabad and he became the Minister of Defense  and  
commander of the Kurdish army. But the life of Kurdish Republic of Mahabad 
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could not be long; after the Soviet Union had signed Yalta Agreement and 
withdrawn from Iran, the Kurdish Republic was dissolved by Iranian troops. 
Until the coup of General Abdul Karim Qasim in 1958, Mustafa Barzani could 
not return to Iraq. The new regime granted constitutional recognition to Kurds 
but Mustafa Barzani and his party, namely KDP, started an armed rebellion 
with peshmergas against the new regime after his demand of autonomy had 
been rejected in 1961. The autonomy demand of Kurds, leaded by Mustafa 
Barzani’s KDP became a concrete matter with the March Manifesto of 1970 
between Baath government and Kurds which consisted of 15 articles to be 
implemented within four years. The articles involve applications in favor of 
Kurdish autonomy like declaring Kurdish as official language in Kurdish 
regions (Dahuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah), the representational power in the 
parliament determined according to population, a Kurdish vice-presidency, 
autonomous Kurdish police and security organizations.
155
 “To be implemented 
within four years” reached its meaning in 1974 with the disagreement between 
the Baath government and KDP over the status of Kirkuk. While Barzani’s 
insistence about the existence of Kirkuk in Kurdish autonomous region 
continued; Baath government who mistrusted Barzani because of his relation 
with Iran was not anymore supporting the implementation of autonomy in 
KDP’s terms.156 The Baath government granted more limited autonomy for 
Northern Iraq without discussing Kerkuk’s status and oil revenues. Then KDP 
launched again an armed rebellion with the support of Iran which had disputes 
with Iraq over Shatt-al Arab. But this armed rebellion would cause Barzani’s 
ultimate defeat with the Iran-Iraq Algeria Agreement in the OPEC meeting of 
1975; Iran took off its support from Barzani’s troops. But Iran’s cooperation 
with Iraqi Kurds would gain ground again after Iraq declared war on Iran on 22 
September 1980. 
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 Iranian authorities and Baghdad had to find allies, for the purpose of 
manipulating internal issues in counterpart’s territories, from Kurdish groups 
which were broken into several factions after Mustafa Barzani’s departure from 
Iraq. These fragmented groups consisted of ex-cadres of Mustafa Barzani’s 
KDP. Jalal Talabani, ex-member of Politburo in KDP, announced the 
formation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on 1 June 1975 in 
Damascus; KDP’s heritor, KDP-Provisional Leadership (KDP-PL) was 
launched in Europe by Masud Barzani, son of Mustafa Barzani in August 
1976.
157
 PUK and KDP played crucial roles in Iran-Iraq war. While Talabani 
let Iraqi army units to use the region under his control for helping Iranian 
Kurds; Mesoud Barzani cooperated with Iranian government and helped them 
to enter northern Iraq.
158
  Both sides used PUK and KDP as their pivotal 
instruments in the war, Baath regime guarantied the loyalty of PUK by 
declaring mutual ceasefire with PUK and offering a broader autonomy 
agreement in 1983. However this ceasefire did not last long; PUK forces 
started to fight against the Baath regime in January 1985. This radical shift in 
the relation between PUK and Baath regime engendered the possibility of 
reconciliation with Mesoud Barzani’s KDP. It is certain that the possibility of 
any kind of cooperation between Kurdish factions would be dangerous for 
PKK and Turkey.  
  Turkey preferred to protect its neutrality in Iran-Iraq war and redoubled 
its trade with belligerent countries. Despite the positive effect of the war, 
Turkey faced a danger, that is the war partnerships of Iran and Iraq respectively 
with KDP and PUK which strengthened Iraqi Kurdish position in Northern Iraq 
and caused a potential instability along the Turkish borders. The existence of a 
shelter in Northern Iraq for PKK was very crucial after the Bekaa valley had 
been risky after the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982. Consequently in 
1982, Abdullah Öcalan reached an agreement with KDP and gained the control 
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of the region in Northern Iraq. Clearly PKK gained an operational advantage 
by moving its bases to Northern Iraq. The direct consequence of the agreement 
is the Protocol of Security signed by Turkey and Iraq in 1984 which gave each 
state the right to enter other’s territory for 5 km. without prior consent. The 
Protocol of Security was the legal infrastructure of Turkish trans-border 
operations until 1989, the trans-border operations between 1983-1989 were 
executed under the legal protection of “hot pursuit” protocol.159 Additional to 
its affects on PKK, this protocol disturbed KDP and PUK in Northern Iraq. 
Turkey destroyed already some KDP bases in its first operation in 1983 against 
PKK. Consequently KDP demanded PKK to move its bases from Northern 
Iraq- Turkish border.  The demand of KDP was not welcomed by PKK and 
Barzani revoked their agreement in 1987 especially after Turkish trans-border 
operations in 1986 and 1987 resulted in Iraqi Kurds deaths. But Abdullah 
Öcalan tried to reach an agreement with Talabani and they signed a mutual 
assistance protocol in Mai 1988. This mutual assistance protocol lost its 
importance for PKK with the Halabja Massacre. It was certain that PKK tried 
to establish good relations successively with KDP and PUK.  But after Iraq had 
invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and following it the international 
community’s military and diplomatic response to this invasion in 1991, namely 
the First Gulf War, altered the existing power relations in the region. 
 Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait evoked international community. Firstly 
United Nations adopted Resolution 661 which embraced economic embargo on 
Iraq on 6 August 1990; then UN adopted resolutions 667 and 670 which 
imposed maritime and air blockade to Iraq and Kuwait in September 1990 and 
finally UN Security Council gave an ultimatum to Iraq with Resolution 678 
which grant time to Iraq until 15 December 1991 for withdrawing from Kuwait 
while implementing all previous resolutions. Operation of Dessert Storm 
started on 17 January 1992 with air operation and continued until 22 February 
1992. The ceasefire was declared on 27 February 1992 following the land 
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operation.  But the post-war settlement which was arranged by the resolution 
686, could not envisage Saddam’s attack with helicopters against the revolting 
Kurds in the Northern Iraq. The post-war measures which implied the ban of 
using fixed wings except Southern Iraq, did not mention the use of rotary 
wings.
160
 But the use of rotary wings by Iraq for dealing with Kurdish riot in 
northern Iraq stimulated the international community’s response with 
Operation Provide Comfort I with extraordinary efforts of Turkey. 
 The provision of camps in Northern Iraq for the returning Kurdish 
refugees with UN resolution 688 on 5 April 1991 aimed at protecting Iraqi 
Kurds in safe havens defended a multinational force formed by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Italy. These camps 
were formed in Northern Iraqi, Zaho. The deployment of military forces from 
Northern Iraq to Turkey (Operation Provide Comfort 2) in the mid-July of 
1991 were implemented in three different places; the land forces of 2500 
American, British, French and Turkish troops in Silopi, the logistic support 
center in Batman and 50 US, British, French and Turkish aircrafts in İncirlik 
air base. The land forces and the logistics center were deployed in September 
1991 by the Turkish government.
161
 The Turkish government’s immediate 
deployment approval without any vote in Turkish General National Assembly 
was directly related to Özal’s dominant role in Turkish foreign policy because 
he prepared the legal infrastructure of a powerful government in the First Gulf 
War successively with the Acts of Government 107 and 126 which granted the 
government the authority to send Turkish troops abroad and to deploy foreign 
troops in Turkish soil.
162
 Consequently in spite of public and parliamentary 
opposition, Özal was at the table not on the menu in post-war settlement as he 
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wanted to be cautious about any possibility of independent Kurdish State.
163
 
Within the process the strongest opposition came from the Foreign Minister Ali 
Bozer and Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay, both of whom resigned to openly 
declare the strength of their opposition. The main reason was the way Ozal 
handled the process and a good example in point was the oil pipeline closure 
with Iraq. Both Bozer and Torumtay heard about the closure through the 
media. All in all, Özal became the sole decision-maker. He built relations 
indirectly with the representatives of Iraqi Kurdish leaders in March 1991. On 
a regular basis he contacted with Iraqi Kurdish leaders for the purpose of 
controlling Northern Iraq and getting PUK’s and KDP’s assistance in the fight 
against PKK. Consequently the post-war settlements prepared a safe haven for 
Iraqi Kurds with the air base in İncirlik and caused a de facto Kurdish state; the 
extensions of Operation Provide Comfort 2 became a matter of internal policy. 
Northern Iraq became a concern of internal policy as much as foreign policy.  
 The renewal of Operation Provide Comfort became one of the 
prominent disputes in 1990’s. Despite the advantages it brought, the main 
concern was the drawbacks it brought. The opinions in favor of the renewal of 
Operation Provide Comfort intensified on Turkey’s international reputation 
which provided the state the chance to continue good relations with Northern 
Iraq; USA’s tacit approval for trans-border operations and control in the region 
which was crucial for the control of PKK militarily and logistically; and the 
preventing the foundation of an autonomous Kurdish state. Similarly, people 
who were against the renewal put same reasons as an argument for rejection 
such as logistic opportunity for PKK created by Operation Provide Comfort; 
the existence of a de-facto autonomous Kurdish State; and the vacuum of 
power because of NGO’s independency in the region and internal disputes 
between PUK and KDP.
164
 Turkish political parties’ opinions also changed 
according to their status as being in the opposition or in the power. For 
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example; SHP and Welfare Party had been against the renewal of the Operation 
Provide Comfort before they came to power. But both voted for the renewal of 
the Operation Comfort as the partners of coalition governments. In other words 
the renewal of Operation Provide Comfort 2 became a state policy, in other 
words, the party which governs the state became the supporter of it. Until 
01.03.2003; it was extended several times in 6-month intervals. It was certain 
that the diversity of opinion about the renewal of Operation Provide Comfort 2 
based on its contradictory affects. On the one hand Turkey’s Iraq policy 
emphasized the political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq; and the strongest 
affect of the Operation, as a result of the existence of a United States air base in 
Turkish soil was to protect Iraqi integrity. On the other hand the existence of a 
de-facto Kurdish state and the strengthening power of PKK in the region 
through political instability were collateral damages of Operation Provide 
Comfort. 
 The declaration of the parliament of de facto Kurdish state in Northern 
Iraq which considered Iraqi Kurdistan as a constituent state in a Federal Iraq, 
came after the local elections.  The result was the distribution of seats between 
PUK (49,2% of the votes) and KDP(50,8% of the votes) in May 1992. This 
distribution produced a state of deadlock in the decision making process. 
Consequently two separate governments in Irbil and in Sulaymaniya 
respectively by KDP and by PUK were settled. Two separate settlements 
provoked tensions between KDP and PUK which culminated as an armed 
struggle in the spring of 1994.
165
 It exposed Turkish state’s security concerns 
Until that time, relations of Turkey with both groups were good, especially 
during the cooperation with the peshmergas of KDP and PUK in the 1992 
Autumn Operation against PKK in Northern Iraq. While Turkey attacked from 
north; the peshmergas moved from south so the operation was called 
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“Sandwich Operation”.166 But Turkish state’s security concerns became 
concrete with the armed struggle of KDP and PUK 
 The clashes between KDP and PUK were directly related to joint 
revenues from Habour border gate. To gain the struggle, both parties 
cooperated with separate actors in the region. The most dangerous one for 
Turkey was PUK and PKK acting conjointly against KDP in 1995. As a result 
Turkey attempted to bring together counterparts, namely KDP and PUK in 
Silopi in June 1994. Meanwhile, the international community also endeavored 
to finish the war between PUK and KDP; after the meeting in Paris in July 
1994 without Turkey, Turkey took measures to prevent any kind of future 
meeting without Turkey such as limiting foreigners’ entrees to Iraq under the 
pretext of protecting territorial integrity of Iraq and contacting with French 
government. Both Turkey and the meeting in Paris could not resolve the 
problem. Talabani occupied Irbil which was under the control of KDP. But the 
peace efforts of international community continued; the next meeting, which 
was organized with the initiative of the USA in Dublin between 10 and 12 
August 1995, resulted with the cease-fire agreement between KDP and PUK.
167
 
Hereafter the armed struggle shifted towards a new one between PKK and 
KDP on 25-26 August 1995. Even if it continued for a very short time period 
that is until December 1995; it was a very determining factor in the formation 
of adversaries in Northern Iraq. On the one hand Iraq state helped KDP to take 
back Irbil from PUK forces in August 1996; on the other hand Iran, Syria, PKK 
and PUK met to cooperate in Northern Iraq before the second Dublin meeting 
in September 1995. The KDP and PUK representatives also met in Tehran not 
to exclude Iran from the process in Northern Iraq.
168
 While these internal 
clashes in Northern Iraq strengthened the existing political vacuum; Turkish 
state tried to fill this vacuum with unilateral trans-border operations. Turkish 
                                                                
166
 Baskın Oran, Kalkık Horoz Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti, p.154 
167
 Baskın Oran, Kalkık Horoz Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti, p.167-173 
168
 Ibid, p.174-178 
 58 
forces which moved along 30 kilometers into Iraq with 35.000 troops on 20 
March 1995 entered Northern Iraq again on 14 May 1997 with 50.000 
troops.
169
 Moreover according to Safeen M. Dizayee, representative of the 
KDP in Ankara, Turkey cooperated with KDP closely in the exchange of 
information and military operations against PKK.
170
Turkey also tried to fill this 
political vacuum by contacting KDP and PUK diplomatically as the political 
party leaders of Iraq since 1992. The representations of KDP and PUK were 
established in Ankara but the state emphasized the fact that Iraq’s territorial 
integrity was more important. For example border gate opening talks in 
Northern Iraq were executed with Iraq’s central authority. Requiring Iraq visa 
from Turks who only pass into Northern Iraq was another example.
171
 In other 
words Turkey’s Iraq policy had a dualistic character; on the one hand they tried 
to prevent the foundation of any Kurdish state by staying in control militarily 
and diplomatically in Northern Iraq; on the other hand they determined their 
Iraq policy by depending on Iraq’s territorial integrity. Iraq’s territorial 
integrity was crucial for Turkey while the state’s main argument in low-
intensity conflict with PKK was protecting the indivisible integrity of Turkish 
Republic with its country and nation. The political parties which appeal 
Kurdish cultural and political rights would be closed; the political 
representation opportunities for these parties would be constrained under the 
pretext of protecting territorial integrity. Consequently Turkey which had to 
struggle diplomatically for Iraq’s territorial integrity to crush an armed 
organization protected its own territorial integrity by closing political parties 
which tried to appeal Kurdish cultural and political rights under the shelter of 
the Parliament. 
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 Pro-Kurdish political parties were founded so as to be a party of 
Turkey; their formation started with the “socialist” deputies of SHP, but it 
could not continue in this way. The identity shift of pro-Kurdish political 
parties was realized with categorical expulsion of parliamentarians right from 
the beginning. This separate categorization formation led to the emergence of 
the concept of “pro-Kurdish party”. Their entry to the Parliament with SHP 
brought the struggle from local level to national arena. Furthermore it is 
obvious that the Parliament provided them the electoral immunity and 
indirectly national legitimacy that was very crucial in immunity crisis. On the 
one hand the national legitimacy did not mean political approval; the political 
constraints of Turkey, namely laws of internal security, anti-terrorism like Law 
of Political Parties, emergency rule or village guard system and, the pragmatist 
nationalist politics of mainstream parties and, the increasing power of PKK 
through the political vacuum in Northern Iraq after the First Gulf War did not 
let the first political party to act and stay within the system freely. On the other 
hand the international context with the First Gulf War in which HEP made 
politics facilitated their framing Kurdish political and cultural rights. But the 
intersection of all relational, cognitive and environmental mechanisms in the 
first period of 1990’s gave rise to the consolidation of all processes such as 
creation of HEP then its transformation to an ethnic-based party or HEP’s 
certification by Turkish political elites and then the closure case or the 
intention of being socialist democratic party and then radicalization through the 
new coming actors. 
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 Chapter 3 Changing Landscape of Kurdish Politics 
 The legal politicization of Kurdish nationalism through political parties 
is a routine phenomenon of Turkish political life. Their trajectory does not end 
with the closure of each party almost in two year intervals. The successive 
parties have always been founded, then the “legal” struggle continued. But 
their political attitude took on a more radical expression with each new party; 
HEP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, DTP and finally BDP. Firstly HEP was founded 
with the intention of becoming a socialist democratic party with a Turkish 
origin chairman, then DEP had a chairman, Yaşar Kaya who said “Our oath is 
death for independance” and finally DTP put Abdullah Öcalan’s offer 
“democratic autonomy” in its party program. But the most important 
determinant in their radicalization was their absence in the Turkish Parliament 
in the period of 1999-2007 because of 10 % national electoral threshold. In 
other words the structural limitations of the Turkish political system did not let 
their entry to the Parliament after a very contentious experience, the oath-
taking ceremony. But the local electoral success of parties in this period was 
the only instrument of “legal” politicization; and it is certain that the political 
struggle of Kurdish mayors with the government was not a simple contention 
because of the existence of different political parties at local and national level. 
It was beyond that; while the governments were changing, the contentious 
actions of Kurdish mayors continued and still continue. 
 As a result of the electoral threshold, the power of pro-Kurdish parties 
in the region declined. In return, Islamic parties gained footage in the region. 
The Islamist parties became the unique rival of these parties. The replacement 
of the center-right main-stream parties by Islamist ones played a major role as 
well as local people’s sensitivity in terms of Islamic values. Moreover Turkey’s 
 61 
candidacy of European Union membership is one of the most important factors 
in this process as the policies of both sides are determined according to this 
agenda. Consequently, liberalization through the EU integration process 
enabled Turkish governments to be more courageous for various openings; and 
the political struggle of parties became more important as a unique legal 
interlocutor for Kurdish people. 
3.1) Radicalization of Kurdish Politics 
The closure case of HEP by the Constitutional Court started in July 
1993 on alleged separatist propaganda accusations. The case was based on 
violations of the Law of Political Parties, especially Articles 78, 80 and 81 
which prohibit activities that threaten the unity of the Turkish state by 
compromising the integrity of the Turkish language, flag, national anthem and 
other symbols of nationhood, and organizing, mobilizing support on the basis 
of race, family and community, religious or sectarian affiliation.
172
 Article 81 
also includes linguistic reservations such as prohibiting a language other than 
Turkish in writing and printing party statues or programs at congresses, at 
meetings in open air or indoor gatherings, in propaganda, in placards, pictures, 
phonograph records, voice and visual tapes, brochures and statements.
173
 These 
alleged violations showed the limited tolerance of Turkish state institutions 
towards any ethnic-based organization like political parties who appeal 
Kurdish cultural and political rights. 
 After ÖZDEP had been closed, HEP administrative cadres were 
renewed in the General Assembly of 3 July 1993 and HEP’s sixteen deputies 
were expelled so as to join Democracy Party. HEP was closed on 14
th
 July 
1993.
174
 But the deputies did not lose their parliamentary seats as they formed 
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DEP prior to the closure of HEP.
175
 DEP’s political adventure would be more 
exciting than HEP. While the immunity crisis would make parties more radical, 
Turkish politics’ vocation with People’s Democracy Party and Democratic 
People’s Party would stay at the local level until the 2007 election because of 
%10 electoral threshold. 
3.1.1) DEP 
The positive atmosphere through the ceasefire declaration of PKK 
brought together different actors of Kurdish political life such as İbrahim 
Aksoy who did not play a part in the foundation of HEP or Şerafettin Elçi, ex-
minister of Ecevit’s CHP government in 1978. The HEP cadres tried to form a 
new party, namely DEP, in a more general manner like it was envisaged in 
HEP’s foundation, but they could assemble almost all Kurdish political actors 
this time. The new party was organized so as to be prospective interlocutor in 
the Kurdish issue after PKK’s ceasefire. Kemal Burkay and Şerafettin Elçi 
were considered as potential chairman of the party but the chairmanship would 
be a problem in the party’s foundation, and İbrahim Aksoy stood as a candidate 
in founder’s meeting. But Yaşar Kaya, the owner of Özgür Gündem176 was 
chosen and a petition was sent to establish the party on 7
th
 May 1993.
177
 It is 
certain that they founded DEP with the claim of being Turkey’s party; yet the 
sudden death of Özal and the hardening of the State’s position led to a similar 
fate for DEP.  Hamit Bozarslan distinguished the similarities between HEP and 
DEP according to their foundation; which were based on parties’ failures or the 
defiency of Turkish political system. He claimed that the party’s aim of being 
interlocutors of the Kurdish issue in the Parliament transformed into a mediator 
role between the State and the PKK. This approach led to the claims of both 
parties allegedly being “the legal branch of PKK”. In other words, he 
emphasized their lack of specific identity and accordingly of independent 
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policies. According to Bozarslan, the generational differences of party 
members were also a problem, because all of them wanted to follow different 
paths of action like in the oath-taking ceremony. Bozarslan not only dealt with 
parties’ handicaps; he also criticized the constraints of Turkish political life 
which were closed strictly to ethnic-based political parties, thanks to the army 
and the State apparatus.
178
 Even though Fuller and Barkey described these two 
as bona fide parties
179
 which intended to be mass- party, DEP would have to 
turn to contentious actions.  
 DEP promoted the “Campaign for Peace” for negotiations with the 
elected members of the population, for freedom to publish, educate and 
broadcast in Kurdish, for the abolition of the emergency rule in the southeast, 
for the removal of the special security forces and village guards, and for the 
introduction of economic measures and judicial reforms in Sultanahmet Square 
on 2 August 1993.
180
 They published a statement which called for “the 
brotherhood of nations” through a democratic solution without violence. The 
party declared that it will organize meetings and gatherings until World Peace 
Day, the first of September. These contentious actions could not be tolerated by 
the State consequently the meetings in Bursa, İzmir and Diyarbakır were 
prohibited; two managers of DEP were killed in Batman and Diyarbakır. The 
Ankara State Security Court prosecuted DEP cadres including Yaşar Kaya, 
İbrahim Aksoy, Murat Bozlak, etc. because of “Campaign for Peace”. The 
charges were based on undermining the indivisible integrity of Turkish 
Republic with its territory and nation on 9 November 1993.
181
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 DEP’s political struggle was harder than HEP because of the hardening 
position of the State and the dominant role of security forces in the region after 
Özal’s death. On the one hand, local branches of the party were the target of 
investigations by the State; on the other hand, they were attacked by armed 
groups. DEP’s regional representation was under strict control. For example, 
DEP deputies
182
 who visited Batman for the investigation of unresolved 
homicides had to act under police surveillance. But the police surveillance 
could not prevent the killings of Mehmet Sincar, the deputy of DEP and Metin 
Özdemir, the provincial DEP chairman of Batman on 4th September 1993. 
According to Ölmez, this incident engendered tension between the government 
and DEP; Mehmet Sincar’s funeral in front of the Parliament was not carried 
out under the pretext of security. Furthermore while he was writing about the 
funeral in detail, he emphasized DEP’s and Mehmet Sincar’s family’s attitude 
not taking the funeral and that the ceremony was organized solely by the State 
in Mardin Kızıltepe on 9th September 1993.183This local fragmentation 
continued during the whole year of 1993. The local branches and the 
mayoralties of DEP
184
 were attacked including its head office in Ankara on 18
th
 
February 1993. Furthermore the local fragmentation spread to party’s cadres in 
the region, and its mayors, provincial chairmen and members even Yaşar Kaya, 
the Chairman of DEP, were arrested because of alleged accusation of 
“speaking against the indivisible integrity of the Turkish Republic with its 
territory and nation” in Bonn and the 11th Salahuddin Congress of Kurdistan 
Democratic Party on 17
th
 September 1993.
185
 On the one hand, this made local 
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organization harder for DEP; on the other hand, they were pushed to find other 
ways than “legal” political representation. 
The year 1993 for DEP ended with the election of a new Chairman, 
Hatip Dicle. Osman Ölmez talked about the probable radicalization of the party 
after Hatip Dicle had been elected as the new Chairman of DEP on 12
th
 
December 1993. He even claimed that on the one hand some parliamentarians 
such as Mahmut Alınak, Orhan Doğan, Sırrı Sakık, Muzaffer Demir, Ahmet 
Türk, Naif Güneş, Mahmut Kılınç, Sedat Yurtdaş and İbrahim Aksoy did not 
want the candidateship of Hatip Dicle because of a possible marginalized 
perception in Turkish political life; on the other hand, Hatip Dicle was 
supported by Leyla Zana, Ali Yiğit, Remzi Kartal, Nizamettin Toğuç and 
Zübeyir Aydar. But Osman Ölmez added that the claim of internal division 
because of approach differentiation in DEP members was left unproved.
186
 
DEP’s preparation for the 1994 election would not be easy under the 
low-intensity war
187
 conditions. The discussions about the withdrawal from 
elections   within DEP came to an end in the Party’s Parliament meeting on 
24
th
 February 1994.
188
 DEP withdrew from the 1994 local elections due to local 
fragmentation but the changes in election law which contained special 
measures for the region such as the changes in hours of voting, gathering of 
voting boxes in a determined place, the opening of boxes in safe places, the 
existence of security forces in voting areas were the some other determinants of 
the withdrawal decision according to Ölmez.189 DEP, which withdrew from 
local elections purposefully, lost the “legal” representation opportunity, but the 
party lost its seats in the Parliament after the party had been closed down in 
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1994. In other words, “legal” Kurdish nationalism which lost all opportunities 
of representation had to stay as a pressure group in the margins of Turkish 
political life until the 1999’s local elections. 
 The upcoming elections in 1994 would be a turning point for DEP 
because the pressure indirectly led DEP out of competition; the party became a 
propaganda instrument for mainstream parties especially for DYP.  Ölmez 
claims that Çiller started the campaign in a “Meeting to Respect Atatürk” on 
28
th
 February 1993 by bringing accusations against DEP members to demolish 
Turkish Republic.
190
 Furthermore she affirmed that they would “remove the 
PKK from Parliament”. Even if the putting on the agenda of the  suspension of 
immunities continued for almost two years through the initiative of the Turkish 
Parliament, the Parliament voted in favor of suspension of the immunity of 
seven deputies including Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana, Orhan Doğan, Sırrı Sakık, 
Ahmet Türk, Mahmut Alınak and Hasan Mezarcı from the Welfare party. The 
parliament approved the removal of the immunity of just six Kurdish deputies, 
not following prosecutor Nusret Demiral’s demand for twenty-two deputies.191 
The capture of Orhan Doğan and Hatip Dicle in front of the Parliament just 
after the suspension caused more tension than the process itself; the Parliament 
claimed that the lifting was not valid until the publication in Official Gazette 
consequently their arrests were considered as an interference in Parliament’s 
sovereignty. Therefore the Parliament provided necessary protection to the rest 
of the deputies until they went to the Prosecutor’s Office voluntarily. The 
parliamentary protection continued even after DEP had been closed down by 
the Constitutional Court on 16
th
 June 1994 based on the submission by the 
Prosecutor Demiral. While Cindoruk was securing Selim Sadak and Sedat 
Yurtdaş, who were sentenced to imprisonment, in Parliament until the 
publication of Constitutional Court’s decision in the Official Gazette, Demirel 
affirmed that “the door to the presidential palace was always open to them” in 
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the meeting with two deputies.
192
 Overall, however these did not keep DEP 
within the Turkish political system. The six deputies were sentenced to 
imprisonment for different time periods. Ahmet Türk, Leyla Zana, Orhan 
Doğan, Hatip Dicle and Selim Sadak were sentenced to 15 years under Article 
168 of Turkish Penal Code for membership of the PKK; Sedat Yurtdaş was 
sentenced to 7 years and 6 months under Article 169 of Turkish Penal Code 
and Mahmut Alınak and Sırrı Sakık were sentenced to 3 years and 6 months 
under Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law, but released on bail.
193
 
 The new party, People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) was founded in 
11
th
 May 1994 before DEP had been closed on 16
th
 June 1994. DEP deputies 
did not prefer to join the new party, instead they decided to stay in DEP. But 
the six representatives of the party, namely; Mahmut Kılınç, Remzi Kartal, 
Zübeyir Aydar, Ali Yiğit, Nizamettin Toğuç and Naif Güneş194  fled to Europe 
before the party had been closed. 
 DEP’s deputies who fled to Europe, joined the Kurdish Parliament in 
exile (KPE). The Kurdish Parliament in Exile was founded to be a partner for 
dialogue in the lack of any Kurdish political actors. Firstly Kurdistan National 
Congress (KUM) was planned as a representational body for Kurdish radical 
organizations, more moderate movements and the Iraqi Kurdistan Front. Kemal 
Burkay’s chairmanship of KUM was almost certain. When the foundation of 
KUM was not realized, the idea of another Parliament was promoted in the 
PKK’s fifth congress in January 1995.195  But the representational power of 
KPE was limited; for example the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK) of Kemal 
Burkay did not participate on the basis of the dominant role of PKK in the 
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Parliament. Furthermore the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Massoud Barzani 
and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Jalal Talabani did not accept the invitation 
of KPE.
196
 The Parliament consisted of 65 members; 12 seats for the National 
Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK), 6 seats for DEP’s deputies in exile and 
the rest were Kurdish personalities who were elected by 500 delegates chosen 
by Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe, Russia and Caucasus, Australia and 
America.
197
 The legitimacy of the Parliament in exile was assured with the 
participation of DEP deputies. DEP deputies claimed that the ban on the party 
and its cadres ruled out all avenues of peaceful solution, so the political 
constraints of the politics in Turkey which did not let the parties stay within the 
system, pushed them to try radical solutions with the PKK.  
 The Parliament’s 35 points program which was declared in its first 
session in the Hague on 12
th
 April 1995, stated expressly the aims of the 
Parliament, which were establishing a national congress and a national 
parliament of a free Kurdistan, entering into voluntary agreements with 
neighboring peoples, supporting and strengthening the national liberation 
struggle to end the foreign occupation of Kurdistan, undertaking programs to 
safeguard the political, cultural and social rights of the Kurds, engaging in 
lobbying for the purpose of convincing members of the international 
community to initiate military, economic and political embargoes on the 
Turkish state, preparing draft resolutions relating to a constitution, citizenship 
laws, conscription laws, civil laws, tax laws, penal laws and an environmental 
protection act…etc.198 Even if the Parliament assembled in Moscow in  
October 1994, Vienna on 30-31th July 1995, Copenhagen in March 1996, 
Rome in July 1996 and Norway in November 1996. Turkey’s efforts to 
prohibit meetings of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile such as the ban of military 
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purchases from Netherlands were important but the most important point 
undermining the representational power was the PKK’s dominance in the 
Parliament. The Parliament disbanded itself in September 1999 and joined the 
National Congress of Kurdistan (KUK).
199
 But the Parliament in Exile 
enhanced the international legitimacy of Kurdish problem in Turkey which 
reached already a certain level with the closure of DEP and the arrests of DEP 
deputies in front of the Turkish Parliament. 
 DEP’s closure damaged enormously the legal representation of Kurdish 
nationalism; the majority of the deputies were prohibited from politics, the 
representation opportunities in the Parliament of parties were eliminated. But 
the People’s Democracy Party was founded in May 1994. Even if HADEP 
could not get any seats in Turkish Parliament because of the 10% threshold, 
local elections in the region became another battleground for political parties. 
3.1.2) HADEP 
HADEP was founded by Murat Bozlak in May 1994. The trajectory of 
parties would continue with HADEP. HADEP was supposed to be the 
interlocutor between the State and Kurdish people but the party Congress in 
June 1996 turned the tide against HADEP’s members. Men wearing masks 
removed the Turkish flag and placed the PKK banner in its place and all   the 
party members were arrested. The State’s judiciary power kept HADEP’s 
actions under surveillance but HADEP’s leaders were cautious, they 
cooperated with police in the November 1998 Congress.
200
 This could not 
prevent the perception of HADEP as the legal branch of PKK. Additionally the 
results of national elections in 1995 and 1999 fueled this perception through 
the high percentages votes of HADEP in the heavily Kurdish populated areas 
of the Southeast.  
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 The election of 24 December 1995 resulted in the victory of the Welfare 
Party (RP), with 21,4% of the vote and 158 deputies. HADEP gained just 4,2% 
of the votes, thus the party could not pass the nation-wide 10 % threshold. 
While the party obtained very high votes like 46,7% in Diyarbakır, 22% in 
Mardin, 26% in Şırnak and Siirt, 27,7% in Van, 37,4 % in Batman, 54,3% in 
Hakkari; it performed poorly in some cities such as 18 % in Ağrı, 7% in 
Bingöl, 10% in Bitlis, 4% in Elazığ, 1% in Erzincan, 6% in Erzurum, 6,7% in 
Kars, 2,8% in Malatya, 2,7% in Maraş, 17% in Muş and Tunceli and 13,6% in 
Urfa.
201
 RP was nearly the unique competitor of HADEP in the region.
202
 On 
the one hand, RP gained almost all the seats in the region as HADEP was 
below the 10% threshold, on the other hand the Islamist party was voted 
enormously in the cities which received Kurdish immigration. For example RP 
gained 56% of the vote in Sultanbeyli (İstanbul) which hosts Kurdish 
emigrated population; while HADEP obtained only 8,5%. There was general 
agreement on the reasons of RP’s electoral success, which were mainly RP’s 
populist and clientelist policies and the anti-system character of the party.
203
 
The main RP policy was to cooperate with Kurdish nationalists who preferred 
not to be close to the PKK and as a result, RP gained electoral seats with 34 
Kurdish deputies in its group.
204
 But the 1999 elections would be a turning 
point for parties.  
Local and national elections were held together in 1999. The 
participation of HADEP in the 1999 elections was uncertain because the 
Prosecutor Office’s had recourse to Constitutional Court for preventing 
HADEP’s entry to the elections after Öcalan’s declarations in his statement 
about PKK’s money contributions to HADEP and the nomination of HADEP’s 
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candidates by PKK. But the Court rejected the recourse. Even if HADEP could 
not pass the electoral threshold with its 4,7% votes HADEP candidates won 37 
municipalities including the metropolitan, Diyarbakır.205 This local 
representation opportunity for the party reinforced the national and 
international legitimacy of the party because local politics would provide them 
representational space in the lack of nationwide deputies. Gambetti highlighted 
this phenomenon “the municipality became the engine force that opened new 
spaces of communication and expression, which not only fostered cultural life, 
but also allowed for new political publics to emerge”.206 Moreover Nicole 
Watts calls local representation as pragmatic and symbolic politics. On the one 
hand, she emphasizes the governing experience by preparing budgets and  
improving socio-economic conditions such as in the Bağlar district of 
Diyarbakır where, the local government opened a health clinic for women, 
widened roads, opened a computer center for youth, coordinated the sale of 
dairy products to prevent milk-borne diseases while the local government of 
Diyarbakır balanced the books and reduced municipal debt; on the other hand, 
she mentioned the importance of local power in representative contention by 
the contentious actions of mayors which were publishing  a three-volume 
history of the city with sections on Kurdish political activism in the 1950’s and 
1960’s, the emergency rule’s negative effects, the organizing of special 
Kurdish festivals especially Newroz.
207
 The field of contention shifted from the 
Parliament to local politics. Kurdish mayors put into action nationalist 
practices; for example the Mayor of Batman, Abdullah Akın, renamed 200 
street names in the city by using Kurdish events, leaders and leftists, but a 
Turkish Court rejected some of them for posing risks to the State’s 
southeastern policy. The constraints of the political system in Turkey are not 
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exclusive to national representation; they are also valid for local powers. The 
more pro-Kurdish mayors, 551 HADEP officials and members were detained; 
57 of them were sent to prison. Furthermore Feridun Çelik, the mayor of 
Diyarbakır; M. Selim Özalp, the mayor of Siirt and Feyzullah Karaaslan, the 
mayor of Bingöl were arrested  following to the allegations of aiding and 
abetting PKK but they were released after 3 days.
208
 It can be said that the 
criticisms of European institutions were determining in the release of mayors 
but the President Demirel described this situation as an internal Turkish matter 
for preventing prospective European pressures. Therefore local offices enabled 
the parties to receive international recognition by the European Union. The 
meetings between government officials from EU member states and HADEP 
increased, reaching to three hundred meetings related to the Kurdish issue.
209
 
Nicole Watts notes the importance of local offices for pro-Kurdish 
parties.  While she highlights the new material resources of mayors which were 
provided through the local office, the representational opportunities offered by 
international organizations can be observed as an official recognition of 
Kurdish elites. But it was symbolic politics that is the focus point of Watts’s 
argument for the power of local political representation. She claimed that local 
mayors attracted attention to the Kurdish issue exclusively by using the tools of 
symbolic politics. The mayors used Kurdish language in their local speeches; 
and they gave importance to local festivals such as Newroz.
210
 In other words, 
they used Kurdish nationalistic tools unconventionally as state’s local 
representatives in the region. This local power of “legal” Kurdish nationalism 
continued after HADEP had been closed by the Constitutional Court on the 
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grounds of supporting PKK in March 2003. 46 members of the party were 
banned for life from participating in political activities again.
211
 
The successor party, Democratic People’s Party, (DEHAP) was 
founded in 1997; HADEP even competed in 2002 general elections under the 
name of DEHAP in case of any prospective closure and increased its votes to 
6,2% nationwide. In 2002 local elections DEHAP preferred to compete with 
the left alliance which consisted of SHP, the Labour Party (EMEP), Freedom 
and Solidarity Party (ÖDP), Free Party and Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) 
under the umbrella of SHP. The candidates won 30 mayoral seats including 
Diyarbakır municipality with Osman Baydemir. While the Prosecutor’s Office 
processed a case for the closure of DEHAP in 2002, the party dissolved itself 
on 17 August 2005 to participate in Democratic Society Movement (DTH) 
founded by Leyla Zana. 
 The trajectory of parties continued with the transformation of DTH to 
Democratic Society Party (DTP). The local representation power of parties was 
bolstered with national representation through the DTP deputies after 2007 
general elections. 
3.1.3) DTP 
Democratic Society Movement was founded by Selim Sadak, Orhan 
Doğan, Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle on 22 October 2004. The transformation of 
the Movement into a party was realized on 9 November 2005. The aim of DTP, 
just like the predecessor parties, was to become the party of Turkey whose 
focus point would be the peaceful, democratic and permanent resolution of the 
Kurdish issue. But according to Orhan Doğan’s declaration, the party could not 
follow the path in spite of delegate-based formation, co-chairmanship model 
and the determination of the party council by the founders. So he mentioned 
that the party could not go beyond being the successor of the previous pro-
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Kurdish parties.
212
 In other words DTP also encountered the same problems as 
the predecessor parties. These problems were the regional character of the 
party and its organic ties with PKK.  Hatem Ete claimed that parties used two 
methods for blocking the accusations of being a regionalist party: to nominate 
candidates who do not come from Kurdish origins and to form electoral 
alliance with left parties. But she added that the radicalization of party cadres 
through each new party and the political constraints of Turkey prohibited pro-
Kurdish party existence within the system.
213
 DTP was also exposed to the 
same pattern with other pro-Kurdish parties but representation at national and 
local level thanks to the liberal atmosphere provided by the EU accession 
process offered more opportunities within the system. 
DTP’s election strategy would be different than its predecessors. They 
chose to stand for the 2007 general elections as independent candidates instead 
of forming an election alliance. DTP run 58 independent candidates for 43 
cities; they planned to get 30-35 deputies but they got only 4% of the votes; 
and 22 representatives were elected. Almost  all of the deputies were  elected 
from Southeastern Turkey; Batman(2), Bitlis(1), Diyarbakır(4), Hakkari(1), 
Iğdır(1), Mardin(2), Muş(2), Siirt(1), Şanlıurfa(1), Şırnak(2), Tunceli(1) and 
Van(2). Only two deputies from İstanbul were elected, Sebahat Tuncel and 
Ufuk Uras. AKP got 86 deputies from the region; the party increased şts votes 
in the region from 20,29% in 2002 general elections to 49,25 in 2007 elections. 
The relative inefficacy of DTP could be explained by the dynamics of AKP’s 
success; however it was also aboutthe party’s own mistakes. Murat Somer 
offered the five reasons for AKP’s success in the region as the development in 
health care and rural infrastructure, tolerance to ethnic-cultural identity, rising 
Islamist conservatism, peaceful resolution opportunity with AKP’s Kurdish 
                                                                
212
 İrfan Aktan, “DTP’nin Bağımsız Adayları, PKK ve 22 Temmuz Sonrası Artılar, Eksiler, 
Çarpılar”, Express, July 2007,p. 13-14 
213
 Hatem Ete, “Örgüt ile Parti Olma Geriliminde DTP”, Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum 
Araştırmaları Vakfı, Mart 2009,p. 6-11 
 75 
deputies and anti-systemic character of the party against military dominance.
214
 
DTP’s candidate selection was very crucial in the party’s limited success as 
well. PKK’s dominance in this process prohibited the selection of candidates 
freely by the party. Furthermore İrfan Aktan claimed that PKK put a reserve on 
the candidateship of Murat Bozlak from Adana and Baskın Oran from İstanbul 
in spite of Ahmet Türk’s persistent effort. İrfan Aktan’s claims about PKK’s 
dominance in DTP covered also the formation of the party. He associated 
Ahmet Türk’s chairmanship in DTP to PKK’s control demand over opponents 
within the party among deputies who had good relations with PKK because 
Ahmet Türk and Murat Bozlak did not hesitate to support Feridun Çelik for 
Diyarbakır municipal candidacy against Osman Baydemir in 2004 local 
elections.
215
 
 PKK secured candidates for the 2007 general elections and at the same 
time continued its attacks after the elections. They killed twelve soldiers and 
captured another eight soldiers at the Iraqi border near Dağlıca in October 
2007. The DTP deputies; Fatma Kurtulan, Aysel Tuğluk and Osman Özçelik’s 
mediation efforts for the liberation of eight soldiers in Northern Iraq were 
perceived as a show of force by official Turkish institutions. While the media 
pointed out private Ramazan Yüce as a traitor because of his Kurdish origins 
and Fatma Kurtulan as a member of PKK with a picture taken in Kandil, Cemil 
Çiçek emphasized that DTP’s deputies had no roles in the liberation of 
soldiers.
216
 The politics of disengagement on the level of military which is 
based on the ignorance of DTP deputies such in the receptions of national 
celebrations continued on the level of government too. The government which 
disregarded the mediation efforts of DTP deputies showed that DTP would not 
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be the accepted interlocutor for the Kurdish issue. But the similarities between 
DTP’s and PKK’s approaches were determining in the government’s attitude 
such as in the case of “democratic autonomy” suggestion of PKK. DTP put the 
“democratic autonomy” suggestion on agenda in its November 2007 Congress, 
but the party envisaged this suggestion narrowly as the extended version of the 
Local Government Law in Turkey. On the contrary, PKK planned a project for 
Iranian, Syrian and Turkish Kurds.
217
 The radicalization of the party was 
completed with the election of Nurettin Demirtaş as Chairman of DTP in this 
Congress.
218
 
Despite the limited success in general elections, the results in upcoming 
local elections in 2009 were good. While AKP could not keep its promises 
related to the Kurdish issue, the existence of pro-Kurdish parties in local 
government was more beneficial for Kurdish people than AKP mayors. AKP’s 
approach to the Kurdish issue changed after the 2007 general elections as 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pointed out in his speech of November 2008 in 
Hakkari: 
“We have a supra identity. This identity is Republic of Turkey 
citizenship. And we said something when we hit the road: One nation, 
one flag, one country, one state, we said. Does anyone oppose this? Can 
somebody say “no, not one nation” or “I don’t accept one flag”? Well, if 
one does not like it, one is free to go anywhere he likes.”219 
It is certain that the nationalist emphasis on Erdoğan’s speech was 
obvious, and AKP cadres chose to disqualify pro-Kurdish mayors in the region 
for the coming local elections by using the system. The mayor of Suriçi 
(District of Diyarbakır), Abdullah Demirbaş was accused of using Kurdish in 
his capacity as the mayor of Sur. The accusations consisted of publication of 
children’s books and tourist brochures in Kurdish by using municipal 
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resources, giving a blessing in Kurdish in a wedding ceremony and proposing 
Kurdish-speaking phone operators and printing public health pamphlets in 
Kurdish. After the investigators of Interior Ministry had prepared a file against 
him, the Interior Minister Abdulkadir Aksu applied to the State Council 
(Danıştay) for the dismissal of mayor Demirbaş. The Council took the decision 
in favor of the Interior Ministry. These cases against the mayors in the region 
were not limited to Abdullah Demirbaş. Osman Baydemir, the mayor of 
Diyarbakır had to endure 150 investigations and 15 pending court cases.220 It is 
claimed that the municipalities in the region could not benefit from the State’s 
resources as much as the AKP mayors as in the case with the mayors of other 
opposition parties. This discriminatory attitude of AKP could not prevent 2009 
local elections results which were in favor of DTP in the region. 
While DTP gained the municipalities of Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Batman, 
Şırnak, Tunceli in 2004 local elections; it regained some AKP municipalities 
like Siirt, Van and Iğdır in 2009 local elections. Furthermore they increased 
their votes in the cities they lost: in Bitlis from 27% to 34%, in Bingöl from 
28% to 33%, in Muş from 25% to 39%, in Ağrı from 29% to 32%, and in 
Mardin from 26% to 36%.
221
 DTP became stronger with national and local 
representatives in Turkish political life but it could not stop the closure case 
against DTP being filed based on the allegations of being “a suit-and-tie-clad 
front for the PKK” on 16th November 2007.222 The prosecutor demanded also 
the ban of 221 party members and 8 deputies; Ahmet Türk, Aysel Tuğluk, 
Fatma Kurtulan, İbrahim Binici, Osman Özçelik, Sebahat Tuncel, Selahattin 
Demirtaş and Sevahir Bayındır from politics,223 the ban of another party based 
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on alleged relations with PKK. But DTP’s attitude against PKK was more 
apparent than the predecessor parties. Emine Ayna, Co-Chairman of DTP in 
the Congress of Woman Branches on 18
th
 May 2008 said that “Öcalan is a 
legal person. We have rights to consider or ignore him like other persons”. 
While the other Chairman of the party, Ahmet Türk emphasized the importance 
of health conditions of Öcalan for the up-coming developments in Turkey, he 
pointed to Öcalan as “the most sensitive point of peace”.224 These contentious 
declarations of DTP members which portrayed Abdullah Öcalan as the final 
authority on the Kurdish issue complicated the problem of the party’s 
representational power. Moreover it is claimed that the DTP’s decision of 
“sine-i millet” which was based on carrying the Parliament off year election 
with the lost of twenty eights deputies (21 deputies from DTP and 6 free 
parliamentary mandates) was blocked by Öcalan.225  Consequently DTP was 
closed on 11
th
 December 2009; Ahmet Türk and Aysel Tuğluk lost their 
parliamentary mandate but the back-up party, Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) had just been founded in May 2008.   
The trajectory of parties continued with the hardening politics of 
Turkish governments after HEP. The more the State tried to restrict the pro-
Kurdish parties within the boundaries of Turkish political life, the more the 
pro-Kurdish parties run for contentious actions. After the options for “legal” 
representation had been prohibited for years, DTP was also kicked out of the 
Parliament. It is certain that the party’s tight relations with PKK played an 
important role in its ban. In addition the political constraints of Turkey did not 
let the party work within the system. But the party also did not hesitate to point 
to PKK as the final authority on the Kurdish issue. The process which could be 
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more productive with the existence of pro-Kurdish parties since 1990 was 
chocked because of the strict approaches of both sides.  
DTP was more fortunate than the predecessor parties because their 
political trajectory went hand in hand with EU accession process and benefited 
from the relatively liberal atmosphere in Turkey through EU reforms. EU 
process also forced internal actors to structural changes in the Kurdish issue. 
3.2) The External and Internal Dynamics of Political Change 
The year 2001 could be accepted as the turning point so far as the 
Kurdish issue in Turkey is concerned. The political actors in the Kurdish issue, 
especially all Turkish governments after 2001, were limited in their decisions 
by the demands of EU accession process. The progress on the Kurdish issue 
was secured through EU; the AKP government took the initiative for being the 
actor who would solve the problem and put forward what was called the 
Kurdish opening. But the Kurdish opening increased more the tensions 
between the actors in the Kurdish problem instead of creating cooperation 
opportunities because of mutual ignorant attitudes of actors. The legal 
infrastructure which was prepared under the EU accession process could not be 
internalized by the State; the legal reforms could not go beyond any kind of 
theoretical preparations.  
3.2.1) EU 
EU is the permanent actor of the Kurdish issue since the official 
acceptance of Turkey as a candidate state in 1999. The relations of the State 
with EU have proceeded in accordance with the regular reports of European 
Commission and the legislative packages of Turkey which shows the results of 
the State’s efforts in EU accession process.  
Turkey as an EU candidate country declared a national program in 2001 
and 2003 that contained measures to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. 
National programs adopted by the Accession Partnership Document signed 
with the EU consisted of preparing constitutional and legislative packages. 
Constitutional articles inconsistent with the Copenhagen political criteria 
 80 
would be modified. In this context, the items that prevent the use of minority 
rights in the Treaty of Lausanne were changed. The change began with the 34 
Articles of the Constitution in 2001. Even if twenty-seven of these articles 
concerned   human rights, the articles relating to the protection of minority 
rights were not numerous. The expression “No language prohibited by law…" 
in the third paragraph of Article 26 which targeted directly the use of Kurdish 
was deleted. The second paragraph of Article 28 which stated that "Publication 
may not be made in any language prohibited by law" was deleted in 
conjunction with Article 26. The second package contained a legislative 
amendment to Article 6 of the Law of Associations, which shortens the text of 
the article by removing again the phrase "No language prohibited by law may 
be used for signs, brochures, plates, statements ... " in March 2002. One of the 
most controversial issues in Kurdish problem, the use of “different languages 
and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” other 
than Turkish was included in the third reform package. While the amendment 
to the article 4 of the Law of Foreign Language Education and Teaching 
authorized instruction of these languages in special courses, the annexation of 
the Foundation Act of Radio and Television provided radio and television 
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. Furthermore the sixth reform 
package in 2003 expanded the broadcasting rights to private radio and 
television channels.
226
 The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation started 
broadcasting in Bosnian, Arabic, Circassian and both dialects of Kurdish 
(Kurmanji and Zazaki) on 7
th
 June 2004 in channel TRT 3 from Monday to 
Friday at 7:30 to 8.00. The radio broadcasting was on Radyo 1 on the same 
days at 6.10 to 6.45. Finally the government founded a new TV channel, 
namely TRT 6 for 24-hour broadcasting in Kurdish on 1 January 2009, just 
before the 2009 local elections. Even if the linguistic reforms were put in 
practice, the political system in remained strictly closed to pro-Kurdish parties. 
The articles of the Law of Political Parties which caused the ban of pro-
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Kurdish parties are still in force. But the Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law 
which contained the causes about the separatist propaganda was abolished with 
the sixth reform package.   
EU prepared at least the legal infrastructure for Kurdish linguistic rights 
and at the same time monitored the application process via its visiting 
committees. The committees paid regular visits to the Eastern region of Turkey 
and meet with local mayors to discuss the conditions of the region. The local 
governors of pro-Kurdish parties in the region became the regular interlocutors 
of EU institutions for Kurdish issue. Mesut Yılmaz as Deputy Prime Minister 
said "The way to the EU goes from Diyarbakır” on 16th December 1999, finally  
accepting the importance of the region in the process of EU as all governments 
would later accept. EU did not only push legal reforms on the Kurdish issue; 
the discursive shift  in Turkey was also visible through EU accession process, 
especially after Turkey had started accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. 
The last 26-item constitutional package which was accepted on 12
th
 September 
2010 by referendum makes political party closures more difficult by 
conditioning all closure cases to the Parliament’s approval. The ultimate 
authority of the Constitutional Court was diminished in favor of less longer 
bans from politics, 3 years instead of 5 years. It is certain that these changes are 
pragmatic actions of AKP to prevent its own closure but they can provide 
continuity for pro-Kurdish parties within the system.
227
 AKP’s Kurdish 
opening initiative was the consequence of this discursive shift and it would be 
the most controversial issue in Turkey for several months. 
3.2.2) The Kurdish Opening 
The beginning of Kurdish opening is considered to be Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s “historical” speech in Diyarbakır on 12th August 2005: 
“Diyarbakır is a province of Turkey as much as Ankara, İstanbul, 
Konya, Samsun and Erzurum. Everybody should understand this. Every 
country has mistakes in its past. Every country has tough days in its past. 
                                                                
227
 http://www.akparti.org.tr/media/www/Anayasa%20teklif%20metni.pdf, 22.12.2010 
 82 
Like other great and powerful states, we reached todays through all those 
though events. For this reason, turning a blind eye to the past mistakes 
does not suit a great state. The great state and great nation is the one which 
has the courage to face with itself and to discuss the mistakes in detail. 
With this understanding does our ruling aim to serve the country. I am the 
Prime Minister of the government, who believes to the self-confidence, 
historical awareness and geography consciousness of my nation and my 
state. I believe that, as facing the past and turning to the future, it is 
possible to guarantee our future with our past because the future is bright. 
While I was imprisoned for reading a poem, I had delivered this message 
to my people “I am never and ever angry with my state. The state, this flag 
and this homeland is ours. One day, the mistakes will be corrected”…Yes, 
This was the message I had delivered from the prison. For this reason, me 
and my friend’s dream is to make everyone equal in every part of this 
country, to make freedoms full available, to make the rule of law dominant 
in the country and to make our children hopeful of their future. We don’t 
have to label each problem we have because they are our problems But if 
you insist on naming it, the “Kurdish” problem doesn’t only belong to a 
sect of this nation, it belongs to us all. It is my problem also. The problems 
don’t have separated origins all the problems are the common problems of 
every citizen of Turkish Republic no matter they are Turkish, Kurdish, 
Circassian, Abkhazian or Laz. Because the sun warms everyone and the 
rain is mercy for everyone. Because we are the people of same land, we 
are a nation. For these reasons, to those who wonder what will happen in 
the Kurdish issue, I reply it concerns me more than anybody as the Prime 
Minister of this country. If they would come with another problem of this 
country, I would again say, it concerns me more than anybody. We are a 
great state and as the nation, we solve and would continue to solve each 
problem with more democracy, citizen rights and more wealth under the 
Constitutional order and under the main principles and the principle o the 
Republic which we have inherited from the founders of this country”228
  
Beşir Atalay declared Erdoğan’s speech as the birth date of the opening 
while he explained the details of the “Democratic Opening” in a governmental 
statement on 29
th
 July 2009.
229
 The launch of “Democratic Opening” was also 
indirectly related to deadlock in the war against PKK because the rejection of 
March 1
st
 bill of the Turkish Parliament which allow troops passage through 
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Turkish soil in the Iraq War in 2003 gave an irreparable damage to Turk-
American relations. Even if Turkish Parliament voted a motion authorizing the 
deployment of troops in Iraq for in security problems in the region on 7 
October 2003; USA authorities could not get the help from Turkey because of 
the opposition of Iraqi Governing Council.
230
 Iraqi Governing Council in 
which Barzani, Talabani and three independent Kurds took place was set up by 
American authorities as a temporary post-Saddam authority in July 2003. 
Furthermore the foreign minister of the transition government was Hoshyar 
Zebari, a top Barzani aide; the Transitional Administrative Law which was 
provisional constitution protected the Kurds’ “Kurdistan Regional 
Government” and let the peshmerga stay in control in the region. Then with the 
constitution referendum on 15 October 2005; the authority of Kurdistan 
Regional government broadened through the recognition of three provinces, 
Dohuk, Irbil and Suleymaniyah as a legal region, the power to alter the 
application of national laws, the possession of internal security forces and 
embassies abroad.
231
 Consequently the Iraqi Kurds became the most important 
partner of the USA in the region; and PKK which took the advantage of 
“Turkey troops free” Northern Iraq with the Iraq War removed the ceasefire on 
2 September 2005 which was declared in February 2000 after Öcalan’s capture 
in February 1999. PKK started to attack Turkish military positions again; 
Dağlıca attack in October 2007 forced Turkish forces to act militarily again in 
Northern Iraq consequently and negotiate with USA. AKP government took 
the approval for trans-border operation from the Parliament on 17 October 
2007 in spite of DTP’s opposition votes. Turkey launched trans-border air 
strikes and ground raids in 2007 and 2008. But AKP government continued to 
contact diplomatically Kurdistan Regional Government; Turkey’s President 
Abdullah Gül met with Iraq President Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Regional 
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Government Nechirvan Barzani on 23 March 2009. The diplomatic and 
military efforts of Turkey could not resolve the problem of PKK consequently 
Turkey launched an internal resolution plan for Kurdish problem. 
The first workshop of “Solution to the Kurdish Problem: Towards a 
Model for Turkey” was organized on August 1, 2009 in Ankara Police 
Academy with the invitation of 15 journalists and academicians related the 
Kurdish issue by Beşir Atalay.232 But he narrowed the scope of the Kurdish 
Opening by eliminating any possibilities of amnesty, education in mother 
tongue and constitutional amendment in the press conference of the Kurdish 
opening on 31th August 2009. Ahmet Türk, the Chairman of DTP openly 
criticized the limited nature of the opening just at the beginning of the process. 
AKP’s opening did not embrace legal pro-Kurdish parties as interlocutors in 
this process, especially after 34 ex-PKK members who came from Habur 
Camp
233
 had been welcomed by DTP members including Ahmet Türk, Emine 
Ayna and other 13 DTP deputies in Iraqi-Turkish border. Tayyip Erdoğan even 
said “We can start all over again if necessary”.234  
 The expression of “Kurdish opening” was the name preferred by the 
media. The government named this process as “Democratic Opening” and 
aimed to lower reactions because of the PKK’s attacks in the region. AKP also 
pushed DTP to declare PKK as a terrorist organization while DTP members 
talked about taking Öcalan as a respondent in the opening process. The attitude 
of AKP could be accepted as one the failures of the opening but DTP members 
could not also take the initiative to lead the process without PKK. While DTP 
did not want a solution without the PKK’s consent and participation, AKP 
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hegemonic role in the process which positioned DTP as spectator cold not the 
necessary framework for a resolution. The aim of AKP, that is isolating PKK 
from the Kurdish problem, could not be possible anymore after all pro-Kurdish 
parties had been excluded from the system through the closure cases. Because 
parties which could not act within the system became closer with PKK and in 
the end, DTP put in its program Öcalan’s suggestion of “democratic 
autonomy”. In other words, while DTP could not see a prospective solution 
without Öcalan, AKP did not accept DTP at least as its counterpart in Kurdish 
Opening. Consequently the Kurdish Opening which was pushed from above by 
the AKP government was still born from the beginning. AKP interrupted the 
process by judging seven mayors of DTP including Osman Baydemir, the 
mayor of Diyarbakır and Hatip Dicle in the trial of the Union of Kurdistan 
Communities, KCK, which is perceived as a civil organization of PKK. 
Furthermore KCK was singled out with PKK as interlocutors in Kurdish 
opening by DTP. BDP followed suit DTP but the limitations of the system also 
did not give much room to move for the successive party. 
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 Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to draw attention to the trajectory of the 
politicization of legal Kurdish nationalism. It is certain that this process has 
different dimensions other than the political maturity of actors. The national 
and international socio-political changes are very determining in the evolution 
of a distinctive political identity as it is the case in the formation of Turkish 
identity after the foundation of the new Republic. The nation-building process 
of the new Republic was the social-political trigger for the politicization of 
Kurdish identity. While the identity struggle of Kurdish nationalism started as 
rebellions, strikes, and social movements in 1920’s and 1930’s, it continued in 
the politics of established institutions and armed organization PKK. The rising 
of ethno-political consciousness in the 1970’s shaped Kurdish political 
identity’s next round of contention as struggle within the Turkish political 
system via parties. The Kurdish political identity has moved along according to 
static Classical Social Movement Agenda until the formation of the first party 
in 1990. After the first political party, HEP had been founded; the static model 
transformed into a more dynamic model in which new generation of Kurdish 
political actors consequently new forms of action took place like oath taking 
ceremony, contentious declarations. While these contentious actions caused the 
perception of legal Kurdish nationalism as the organic partner of PKK, the 
judicial power of the Turkish state has not let the parties to practice politics 
within the system by closing down HEP, ÖZDEP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP and 
finally DEP. The attitude of the judiciary could provide partial explanation for 
the absence of parties in Turkish political life; the other part of the explanation 
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is strictly related to the “unspoken” borders of the political system in Turkey. 
But the political parties had the obligatory social approbation by always trying 
to stay within the Turkish political system. Perhaps the most important political 
limit is 10% election threshold which was not even considered in recent 
amendments to the 1982 Constitution. In other words the national sovereignty 
in Turkey is ignored in favor of political stability or the indivisible integrity of 
the Turkish Republic. Even if the Kurdish People have representatives in the 
Parliament, they are not perceived as interlocutors of Kurdish people as DTP’s 
position in Kurdish opening shows. And that is the reason why political parties 
chose to act as unconventional actors of Turkish political life with their 
contentious actions. 
The unconventionality of parties could be explained by the restrictive 
nature of Turkish political life; however part of the explanation comes from the 
organic ties of parties and PKK. In other words the existence of parties which 
frame their grievances in Turkish parliament does not pave the way for 
disappearance of organizations which makes extreme policies like PKK with 
the opportunity expansion. The dualistic character of ethnic contention in 
Turkey, contained and transgressive one at the same time; prevented the 
political parties who appeal Kurdish political and cultural rights to take 
initiative in the resolution process like in the process of Kurdish opening. The 
cadres of political parties may have relations with PKK on different levels and 
it is certain that their societal base is same. Parties could not form a distinctive 
identity than the PKK and they could not make politics generally without the 
blessing of PKK as in the formation of HEP. The reasons of their dependency 
could be perceived the above-mentioned relational mechanisms.  All in all, the 
pro-Kurdish political parties are the dependent variable in Turkish life.  On the 
one hand, the parties were criticized because of their organic ties with PKK; on 
the other hand they could not have sufficient material and moral resources for a 
struggle against PKK. PKK is still the most important actor of Kurdish 
problem in spite of the existence of parties for twenty years.   
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